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ROBERT S . LIPPERT , 
AY 13 2011 
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Appealed from the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho , in and 
for Clearwater County 
Honorable CARL B. KERRICK , District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 







Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Clearwater 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE CARL B. KERRICK, DISTRICT JUDGE 
Counsel for Respondents 
Mr. Lawrence G. Wasden 
Attorney General 
Post Office Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0188 
Counsel for Appellant 
State Appellant Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, ID 83703 
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Second Ju I District Court - Clearwater County 
ROA Report 
lte: 4/6/2011 
lle: 02:54 PM 
1ge 1 of 7 Case: CR-2005-0000561 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
Defendant: Lippert, Robert S 
tate of Idaho vs. Robert S Lippert 
lte Code User 
3/2005 NEWC CHRISTY New Case Filed 
CRCO CHRISTY Criminal Complaint 
AFFD CHRISTY Affidavit For Initial Determination Of Probable 
Cause For Issuance Of Arrest Warrant 
MOTN CHRISTY Motion For Arrest Warrant And For Bond 
ORDR CHRISTY Order For Arrest Warrant And For Bond 
WARI CHRISTY Warrant Issued - Arrest Bond amount: 75000.00 
Defendant: Lippert, Robert S 
PROS CHRISTY Prosecutor assigned John A Swayne 
11/2005 WART RENEE Warrant Returned Defendant: Lippert, Robert S 
HRSC RENEE Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 07/11/2005 
01:00 PM) 
ARRN RENEE Hearing result for Arraignment held on 
07/11/200501 :00 PM: Arraignment 1 First 
Appearance 
FINS RENEE Financial Statement And Order 
ORPD RENEE Defendant: Lippert, Robert S Order Appointing 
Public Defender Public defender John R 
Hathaway 
ACKR RENEE Acknowledgement Of Rights 
NCO RENEE No Contact Order 
HRSC RENEE Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary 07/25/2005 
10:00 AM) 
12/2005 RNCO RENEE Return On No Contact Order-Defendant 
13/2005 SCDS SUE State's Compliance With Discovery 
14/2005 SUPP VICKY State's Supplemental Response To Request 
For Discovery 
18/2005 RDIS VICKY Request For Discovery 
20/2005 SUBR RENEE Subpoena Returned-Becky Drewery 
21/2005 SDIS SUE State's supplemental discovery 
SDIS SUE State's discovery compliance 
User: COURTNEY 
Judge 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
Randall W. Robinson 
John H. Bradbury 
John H. Bradbury 
25/2005 BOUN RENEE Hearing result for Preliminary held on 07/25/2005 Randall W. Robinson 
10:00 AM: Bound Over (after Prelim) 
CMIN RENEE Court Minutes Randall W. Robinson 
HRSC RENEE Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 07/26/2005 John H. Bradbury 
03:00 PM) 
ORBO RENEE Order Binding Over Randall W. Robinson 
INFO RENEE Information John H. Bradbury 
MOTN CHRISTY Motion To Disqualify Judge John H. Bradbury John H. Bradbury 
26/2005 ORDJ SUE Order Regarding Disqualification of Judge John H. Bradbury 
HRi?&GISTI~~@F ACTI01't1earing result for Arraignment held on John H. Bradbury 
07/26/2005 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Second District Court - Clearwater County 
ROA Report 
User: COURTNEY lte: 4/6/2011 
l1e: 02:54 PM 
1ge 2 of 7 Case: CR-2005-0000561 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
Defendant: Lippert, Robert S 







































































Change Assigned Judge 
Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 08/03/2005 
10:30 AM) 
State's Supplemental Discoveryf 
Motion for preparation of preliminary hearing 
transcript 
Affidavit of council for transcript 
Hearing result for Arraignment held on 
08/03/200510:30 AM: Arraignment! First 
Appearance 
Appear & Plead Not Guilty 
Court Minutes 
Order for Payment of Transcript Preparation 
Judge 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
John H. Bradbury 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
State's Discovery Carl B. Kerrick 
State's Compliance With Discovery Carl B. Kerrick 
Order Setting Jury Trial and Scheduling Carl B. Kerrick 
Proceedings 
Hearing Scheduled (Final Pretrial and Motions Carl B. Kerrick 
10/20/2005 10:30 AM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 11/07/200509:30 Carl B. Kerrick 
AM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 
10/26/200510:30 AM) 
Amended Notice Of Hearing 
State's Supplemental Discovery 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
State's Request For Discovery Disclosure; Alibi Carl B. Kerrick 
Demand 
Notice of intent Carl B. Kerrick 
State's Supplemental Discovery Carl B. Kerrick 
Supplemental Request For Discovery Carl B. Kerrick 
State's Supplemental Response To Request Carl B. Kerrick 
For Discovery 
Motion for order compelling response to state's Carl B. Kerrick 
request for discovery and alibi demand 
Affidavit in support of motion for order compelling Carl B. Kerrick 
response to State's request for discovery and alibi 
demand 
State's Discovery 
Response To Request For Discoverylplaintiff 
SOlS SUE State's supplemental discovery 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
SUBR SUE Subpoena Returned 
REGISTER OF ACTION 
SUBR SUE Subpoena Returned 
Second J District Court - Clearwater County 
ROA Report 
User: COURTNEY lte: 4/6/2011 
ne: 02:54 PM 
Ige 3 of 7 Case: CR-2005-0000561 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 




































































REGISTER OF ACTION 
ADDL RENEE 
Defendant: Lippert, Robert S 
Judge 
Affidavit of council in support of motion for order Carl B. Kerrick 
compelling response to discovery 
Affidavit of council in support of motion for order Carl B. Kerrick 
compelling response to defs. request for 
discovery 
Motion in limine re: statements Carl B. Kerrick 
Motion in Limine (prior bad acts) Carl B. Kerrick 
Motion in Limine (domestic violence) Carl B. Kerrick 
Motion for order compelling response to Carl B. Kerrick 
defendant's request for discovery 
Notice Of Hearing Carl B. Kerrick 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 11/07/2005 Carl B. Kerrick 
09:30 AM: Continued 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on 
10/26/2005 10:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Court Minutes 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 01/26/200609:30 Carl B. Kerrick 
AM) 
Hearing result for Final Pretrial and Motions held Carl B. Kerrick 
on 10/20/200510:30 AM: Hearing Held 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/16/2005 10:00 Carl B. Kerrick 
AM) 
State's Supplemental Discovery 
Continued (Jury Trial 01/23/200609:30 AM) 
State's Compliance With Discovery 
State's Compliance With Discovery 
Memorandum in support of State's Notice of 
Intent 
Supplemental Notice of Intent 
Supplemental Response To Request For 
Discovery 
Supplemental Request For Discovery 
Hearing result for Motion held on 11/16/2005 
10:00 AM: Hearing Held 
Court Minutes 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Carl B. Kerrick 
01/06/200602:00 PM) Court will initiate the call 
Notice Of Hearing 
Affidavit in support of out-of-county service of 
subpoena 
Affidavit in support of out-of-county service of 
subpoena 
State's Supplemental Discovery 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
/} 
Ite: 4/6/2011 Second J District Court - Clearwater County User: COURTNEY 
ne: 02:54 PM ROA Report 
1ge 4 of 7 Case: CR-2005-0000561 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
Defendant: Lippert, Robert S 
tate of Idaho vs. Robert S Lippert 
lte Code User Judge 
17/2005 AFFD SUE Affidavit Carl B. Kerrick 
113/2005 SUBR CHRISTY Subpoena Returned - Mike Perman Carl B. Kerrick 
114/2005 NOTC SUE Notice of motion hearing Carl B. Kerrick 
HRSC SUE Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/04/200602:00 Carl B. Kerrick 
PM) 
116/2005 SDIS SHARON State's Supplemental Discovery Carl B. Kerrick 
120/2005 PETN SUE Petition to compel attendance Carl B. Kerrick 
PETN SUE Petition to compel attendance Carl B. Kerrick 
PETN SUE Petition to compel attendance Carl B. Kerrick 
PETN SUE Petition to compel attendance Carl B. Kerrick 
121/2005 CERT SUE Certificate to secure attendance Carl B. Kerrick 
CERT SUE Certificate to secure attendance Carl B. Kerrick 
CERT SUE Certificate to secure attendance Carl B. Kerrick 
122/2005 AFFD SUE Affidavit in support of out-of-state subpoena Carl B. Kerrick 
AFFD SUE Affidavit in support of out-of-state subpoena Carl B. Kerrick 
AFFD SUE Affidavit in support of out-of-state subpoena Carl B. Kerrick 
.123/2005 MOTN SUE Motion for order to take deposition Carl B. Kerrick 
NOTH SUE Notice Of Hearing Carl B. Kerrick 
SUPP SUE State's Supplemental Response To Request Carl B. Kerrick 
For Discovery 
128/2005 NOTC SUE Notice to use deposition at jury trial Carl B. Kerrick 
SUBR SUE Subpoena Returned Carl B. Kerrick 
SUBR SUE Subpoena Returned Carl B. Kerrick 
SUBR SUE Subpoena Returned Carl B. Kerrick 
SUBR SUE Subpoena Returned Carl B. Kerrick 
3/2006 SUBR SHARON Subpoena Returned Carl B. Kerrick 
SUBR SHARON Subpoena Returned Carl B. Kerrick 
4/2006 MOTN SUE Motion in limine objection to deposition testimony Carl B. Kerrick 
MOTN SUE Motion in limine objection to 404B evidence Carl B. Kerrick 
HRHD SUE Hearing result for Motion held on 01/04/2006 Carl B. Kerrick 
02:00 PM: Hearing Held 
CMIN SUE Court Minutes Carl B. Kerrick 
5/2006 HRHD SUE Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on Carl B. Kerrick 
01/06/200602:00 PM: Hearing Held Court will 
initiate the call 
10/2006 MISC SUE District Court Jury Panel Carl B. Kerrick 
18/2006 SDIS CHRISTY State's Supplemental Discovery Carl B. Kerrick 
19/2006 SUBR SHARON Subpoena Returned Carl B. Kerrick 
20/2006 ST&EGIST~~F ACTIONState Exhibit List and witness list Carl B. Kerrick 
I I 
Second District Court - Clearwater County 
ROA Report 
User: COURTNEY Ite: 4/6/2011 
ne: 02:54 PM 
Ige 5 of 7 Case: CR-2005-0000561 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
Defendant: Lippert, Robert S 
tate of Idaho VS. Robert S Lippert 
Ite Code User Judge 
WI2006 WITN SUE Defendant's witness & exhibit list Carl B. Kerrick 
DFJI SUE Defendants Requested Jury Instructions Carl B. Kerrick 
AFFD SUE Affidavit of council for preparation of pre-trial Carl B. Kerrick 
hearing transcript 
MOTN SUE Motion for preparation of pre-trial hearing Carl B. Kerrick 
transcript at public expense 
SRJI SUE State's Requested Jury Instructions Carl B. Kerrick 
~3/2006 JTST SUE Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 01/23/2006 Carl B. Kerrick 
09:30 AM: Jury Trial Started 
~5/2006 SOlS SUE State's Supplemental Discovery Carl B. Kerrick 
~6/2006 WITN SUE Witness List Carl B. Kerrick 
JURY SUE Jury Chart Carl B. Kerrick 
EXLT SUE Exhibit List Carl B. Kerrick 
JUIN SUE Jury Instructions Filed Carl B. Kerrick 
VERD SUE Verdict Form Carl B. Kerrick 
ORDR SUE Order for psycholsexual evaluation Carl B. Kerrick 
CMIN SUE Court Minutes Carl B. Kerrick 
FOGT SUE Found Guilty After Trial Carl B. Kerrick 
HRSC SUE Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 04/21/2006 Carl B. Kerrick 
10:00 AM) 
31/2006 CONT SUE Hearing result for Sentencing held on 04/21/2006 Carl B. Kerrick 
10:00 AM: Continued 
HRSC SUE Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 04/27/2006 Carl B. Kerrick 
10:00 AM) 
SUE Notice Of Hearing Carl B. Kerrick 
26/2006 AFFD VICKY Affidavit For Restitution Carl B. Kerrick 
27/2006 SENT VICKY Hearing result for Sentencing held on 04/27/2006 Carl B. Kerrick 
10:00 AM: Sentencing 
CMIN VICKY Court Minutes Carl B. Kerrick 
SNIC VICKY Sentenced To Incarceration (118-1506 Sexual Carl B. Kerrick 
Abuse Of Child Under 16) Confinement 
terms:Penitentiary determinate: 6 
years. Penitentiary indeterminate: 9 years. 
SNPF VICKY Sentenced To Pay Fine 297.50 charge: 118-1506 Carl B. Kerrick 
Sexual Abuse Of Child Under 16 
RESO VICKY Restitution Ordered 25000.00 victim # 1 Carl B. Kerrick 
COMI VICKY Commitment Of Imprisonment Carl B. Kerrick 
NOTA RENEE NOTICE OF APPEAL Carl B. Kerrick 
AFFD RENEE Affidavit of Counsel Carl B. Kerrick 
MOTN RENEE Motion to Appoint State Appellate Public Carl B. Kerrick 
REGISTER OF ACTION Defender 
ORDR RENEE Order Appointing State Appellate Public Defender Carl B. Kerrick 
Ite: 4/6/2011 
ne: 02:54 PM 
Ige 6 of 7 
Second Ju I District Court - Clearwater County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2005-0000561 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
Defendant: Lippert, Robert S 
User: COURTNEY 






































































REGISTER OF ACTION 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
Subpoena Returned 
Judgment of conviction 
Scanned 5/16/06 
Civil Judgment and Order of Restitution 
Scanned 5/16/06 
Restitution Ordered 5000.00 victim # 2 
Amended Notice of Appeal 
Notice Of Lodging Reporter's Transcript and 
Clerk's Record 
Notice of lodging of reporter's supplemental 
transcript 
Motion for status conference 
Order for telephonic status conference 
Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status 
Conference 02/01/200809:00 AM) court to 
initiate the call from NP Co. chambers 
Judge 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference Carl B. Kerrick 
held on 02/01/2008 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
court to initiate the call from NP Co. chambers 
Remittitur Carl B. Kerrick 
Order for telephonic status conference Carl B. Kerrick 
Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status Carl B. Kerrick 
Conference 05/19/2008 11 :00 AM) Judge 
Kerrick will initiate call from Chambers in Nez 
Perce Co., Lewiston 
Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference Carl B. Kerrick 
held on 05/19/2008 11 :00 AM: Hearing Held 
Judge Kerrick will initiate call from Chambers in 
Nez Perce Co., Lewiston 
Order for status/scheduling conference Carl B. Kerrick 
Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference Carl B. Kerrick 
06/09/200801:30 AM) 
Court Minutes Carl B. Kerrick 
Order To Transport & Notice of Hearing Carl B. Kerrick 
Hearing result for Status Conference held on Carl B. Kerrick 
06/09/2008 01 :30 AM: Hearing Held 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/27/2008 10:00 Carl B. Kerrick 
AM) 
Hearing result for Motion held on 08/27/2008 
10:00 AM: Interim Hearing Held 
Carl B. Kerrick 
I _ 
Ite: 4/6/2011 Second J District Court - Clearwater County User: COURTNEY 
ne: 02:54 PM ROA Report 
ge 7 of 7 Case: CR-2005-0000561 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
Defendant: Lippert, Robert S 
tate of Idaho vs. Robert S Lippert 
Ite Code User Judge 
:7/2008 CMIN RENEE Court Minutes Hearing type: Evidentiary Hearing Carl B. Kerrick 
Hearing date: 8/27/2008 Time: 10:00 am Court 
reporter: Nancy Towler Audio tape number: 
CD#293-2 
10/2008 NOTC SUE Notice of substitution of counsel and withdrawal Carl B. Kerrick 
APER SUE Defendant: Lippert, Robert S Appearance Carl B. Kerrick 
Douglas D Phelps 
11/2008 HRSC BARBIE Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Carl B. Kerrick 
09/15/2008 10:00 AM) 
BARBIE Notice Of Hearing Carl B. Kerrick 
SUE Notice Of Hearing Carl B. Kerrick 
15/2008 HRHD RENEE Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Carl B. Kerrick 
09/15/2008 10:00 AM: Hearing Held 
CMIN RENEE Court Minutes Hearing type: Evidentiary Hearing, Carl B. Kerrick 
Continued Hearing date: 9/1512008 Time: 9:59 
am Court reporter: Linda Carlton Audio tape 
number: CD#293-2 
DCHH RENEE District Court Hearing Held Carl B. Kerrick 
Court Reporter: Keith Evans 
Number of Transcript Pages for hearing 
estimated: 
LESS THAN 100 pages/cost more than $100 
ORTP RENEE Order To Transport Carl B. Kerrick 
1/2/2008 MEMO RENEE Memorandum of law (defendant's) Carl B. Kerrick 
1/20/2008 MEMO SUE Memorandum of Law Carl B. Kerrick 
/2012008 MEMO RENEE Memorandum opinion and order on remand to Carl B. Kerrick 
determine motion for substitute counsel 
2212011 ORDR CHRISTY Order Vacating and Reentering Memorandum Carl B. Kerrick 
Opinion and Order on Remand to Determine 
Motion for Substitute Counsel 
SCAN CHRISTY Scanned: Carl B. Kerrick 
7/2011 NOTA COURTNEY NOTICE OF APPEAL Carl B. Kerrick 
MOTN COURTNEY Motion and Affidavit in Support For Appointment Carl B. Kerrick 
Of Counsel 
MOTN COURTNEY Motion and Affidavit For Permission TO Proceed Carl B. Kerrick 
On Partial Payment OF COurt Fees (Prisoner) 
11/2011 ORDR COURTNEY Order Granting Motion For Appointment Of Carl B. Kerrick 
Counsel 
REGISTER OF ACTION 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 












CASE NO. CR05-0056l 
ORDER FOR STATUS/SCHEDULING 
CONFERENCE 
This matter shall be set for Status/Scheduling Conference on June 9, 2008 at 1 :30 
p.m. Pacific Time at the Clearwater County Courthouse in Orofino. Defendant shall be present by 
telephone and the Court will initiate the call. The Status/Scheduling Conference is to schedule a 
hearing as required by the Court of Appeals in its Opinion in this cause dated December 19,2007 
and the Remittitur dated April 17, 2008, attached. 
Dated this )..o1\iay of May, 2008. 
CARL B. KERRICK-District Judge 
ORDER FOR STATUS/SCHEDULING 1 
CONFERENCE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAlLING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of 
the foregoing ORDER FOR STATUS/ 
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE was mailed, 
postage prepaid, by the Ulltfrsigned at 
Lewiston, Idaho, this;;?o day of 
May, 2008, to: 
Lori M. Gilmore 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
PO Box 2627 
Orofmo ill 83544 
John R. Hathaway 
PO Box 271 
Orofmo ill 83544 
Robert Scott Lippert 
Bonner County Jail 
4001 NBoyer 
Sandpoint ill 83864 
Clerk of the Court 
Clearwater County 
POBox 586 
Orofino ill 83544 
Bonner County Jail 
4001 N Boyer 
Sandpoint ill 83864 
PATTYO. WEEKS, Clerk 
B 
ORDER FOR STATUS/SCHEDULING 2 
CONFERENCE 
Q 
o No. (),(2 ~ l:, 
,:,ied lilt/oS, 
at l: L£ [lo'clock p: M 
• /)...' I 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOF. THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 














Carl Kerrick, District Judge Presiding 
Lori Gilmore, Attorney for the Plaintiff 
CASE NO. CR2005-1086 
COUqT MINUTES 
John Hathaway, Attorney for the Defendant 
Keith Evans, Court Reporter 
Date: 6/9/08 Tape: CD301-1 Time: 1 :30 p.m. 
Subject of Proceeding: Scheduling conference 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FOOTAGE: 
1 :30 Court gives introductions. Defendant present telephonically. Court advises that 
there is still an issue pending pursuant to the Court of Appeals. Court advises the 
defendant that this hearing is being '1eld as a scheduling conference. Court reads 
the Court of Appeals directives. Court sets a hearing for August 27, 2008 at 10:00 
a.m. 
1 :36 Mr. Lippert questions the Court regarding counsel and protocol at the hearing. 
1 :36 Court responds and explains the proc.ess at the hearing. 
1 :38 Mr. Lippert questions the court regarding witnesses. 
1 :39 Court advises that if there are witnesses then the court will review this issue at the 
hearing. 
Sue K. Summerton-Deputy clerk 
COURT MINUTES - 1 
1 :39 Mr. Lippert questions the court regarding questions prior to the hearing. 
1 :39 Court advises the defendant may seld questions to him along with counsel. 
1 :40 Court in recess. 
Sue K. Summerton - Deputy Clerk 
COURT MINUTES - 2 
Approved: r!p?2J~) 
District Judge 
JUN. 17. 2008 2:47PM Drs COURT 
TO:CLEARWAT~ COUNTY 
NO. 2832 P. 1 
CARRIE BiRO 
CLERK-OISTRICT COURT 
\ CLEARWATER COUNTY 
OROFINO. IDAHO 
lOOD JUN 11 P ): '4 b 
CASE Hrf':?? 5 --{ ~(p 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE S:l-~ 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR fHE COUNTY OF CLEARWPlr6R '~E:Pun' 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) CASE NO. CR2005-1086 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
- vs::- ' - -' -- . -~.\---
) , ORDER TO TRANSPORT 
- _.)-- .- A"N1:tNOTICE"d'p}t~G-'-'- ---,,- ,--"-----,. - _. 
) 
ROBERT LIPPERT, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THA-:- the Defendant. ROBERT LIPPERT, be 
transported to the Clearwater County District Court. 150 Michigan Avenue, Orofino, 
Idaho, for an eVidentiary hearing on August 27, 2008 at 10:00 a.m, 
DATED this 1'7 iaay of June, 2008, 
ORDER TO TRANSPORT AND 




_"_ _ __ \_ .. _ •• *_oJ. .. 
JUN, 17,2008 2:47PM rT "T COURT NO, 2832 p, 2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER TO TRANSPORT AND 
NOTICE OF HEARING was m.ail~, postage prepaid, or hand delivered by the 
undersigned at Orofino, Idaho this 1.W tJay of June, 2008 on: 
Idaho Department of Correction 
Central Records/Inmate Transport 
FAX: 208-327-7444 
John Hathaway 
Attorney at Law 
Courthouse Mail 
Orofino, ID 83544 - -........ -...- --~-,:-.- -.- ._-.:....",.. .. _.-
Robert Scott Lippert 
Bonner County Jail 
4001 N. Boyer 
Sandpoint, 1083864 
Clearwater County Sheriff 
ClealWater County Courthouse 
Orofino, 10 83544 
Lori Gilmore 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Courthouse Mail 
Orofino, ID 83544 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
STATE OF IDAHO 
v. 









. CASE NO. CR-05-561 
. NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION 
OF COUNSEL AND WITHDRAWAL 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Jack 
Hathaway, Public Defender, hereby stipulate to the substitution of Phelps & Associates, 
PS, Private Counsel, as attorney of record for the Defendant in all further proceedings 
and authorizing the withdrawal of Jack Hathaway from the above-entitled case. It is 
further requested that copies of all future notices and pleadings should be directed to 
2903 N. Stout Rd., Spokane, WA 99206-4373. 
This stipulation is based upon the grounds that Defendant has secured Phelps & 
Associates, PS as prlva~e Counsel in this matter, and it is in the best interest of the 
Defendant and Jack Hathaway, Public Defender; that the substitution and withdrawal 
be approved. 
Stipulation for Substitution of Couusel 
and Withdrawal -lof2 
@OO2l003 
ji) 
09/10/20}~8 WED 13:09 FA,! 599 802 Phelps & Associates 
DATED this /::; Day of September, 2008. 
JA ATHAWAY 
THDRAWING ATTORNEY 
DATEDthis \0 DaYOfseptember,:u ____ . 
~ .. -- . 
Stipulation for Substitution of Counsel 
and Withdrawal -2 of 2 
DOUGLAS D. PHELPS 
SUBSTITUTING ATTORNEY 
Ig] 003/003 . 
ih 
ate: 9/3/2008 
me: 11:43 AM 
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Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County 
Minutes Report 
Case: CR-2005-0000561 
Defendant: Lippert, Robert S 
All Items 
User: RENEE 
Hearing type: EVidentiary Hearing Minutes date: 08/27/2008 





End time: 10: 11 AM 
Audio tape number: CD#293-2 
Prosecutor: Lori M. Gilmore 
Defense attorney: John R Hathaway 
Tape Counter: 1000 
Tape Counter: 1002 
Tape Counter: 1003 
Tape Counter: 1003 
Tape Counter: 1004 
Tape Counter: 1006 
Tape Counter: 1009 
Tape Counter: 1009 
Tape Counter: 1009 
Tape Counter: 1010 
Tape Counter: 1011 
Court gives introductions, reviews the Court of Appeals decision and will conduct an 
inquiry re: did Mr. Lippert have good cause to request new counsel on the 1 st day of the 
Trial and will give Mr. Lippert the 1 st opportunity to argue his position. 
Mr. Lippert advises the Court he was transported here but with no paperwork-it hasn't 
caught up with him. He further advises he thought the hearing was at 1 PM and he has an 
attorney coming from Spokane who isn't here yet. He advises he can't proceed without 
his paperwork or his attorney. 
Court asks the parties when the paperwork will be here. The bailiff advises the jail staff is 
trying to locate it. 
Court asks Mr. Lippert the name of his attorney. He responds Peter Jones. Court asks if 
he is ready to proceed. He advises no as he hasn't talked to his attorney yet. 
Court advises there is no contact by Mr. Jones to the Court, reviews the purpose of 
today's proceedings is for Mr. Lippert to present his complaints re: Mr. Hathaway's 
representation of him in the matter, allow Mr. Hathaway to respond and then render a 
decision. Court advises it can reschedule the matter to allow Mr. Lippert proper 
representation, he will continue to be held here until his paperwork arrives and asks the 
jail to notify the Court when it does so it can reset the hearing. 
Ms. Gilmore asks where the paperwork is. Mr. Lippert advises when he was shipped out 
from ICC they were supposed to box it up & send it along, outlines the transport process & 
what he's been told re: where it is. 
Mr. Hathaway remarks. 
Mr. Lippert remarks. 
Ms. Gilmore advises she has a scheduling conflict with continuing @ 1 PM today. 
Court asks the jail staff, Ms. Gilmore & Mr. Hathaway to see if they can locate Mr. 
Lippert's paperwork & once it gets here, it will reset the matter as soon as possible. Court 
advises Mr. Lippert it would be helpful if his attorney would file something with the Court 
and the attorneys. 
Court in recess. 
Renee' Robins 
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CASE NO. CR2005-1086 
ORDER TO TRANSPORT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Defendant. ROBERT S LIPPERT, be 
transported by the Idaho Department of Corrections back to the Idaho Department of 
Corrections. 
DATED this 15th day of September, 2008. 
ORDER TO TRANSPORT - 1 
CARL B KERRICK 
District Judge 
1dJ002/003 
0')( J. ESEP. 15. 2008·:< 2: 33PMut 2(H~ r COURT~WATER co COURT --- NPC DIS NO. 5643 P. 211oo3/oo3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER TO TRANSPORT was 
mailed, faxed or hand delivered by the undersigned at Orofino, Jdah.o this 15th day of 
September, 2008 on: . 
Idaho Department of Correction 
Central Recordsllnmate Transport 
Faxed: 208-327-7444) 
Clearwater County Sheriff'S Office 
Courthouse Mail, Orofino, Idaho 83544 
Hand delivered 
Loti M Gilmore 
Clearwater County Deputy Prosecutor 
CourthouseMail.Orofino.ID 83544 
Hand delivered 
Robert Scott Lippert 
Clea,rwater County Jail 
Courthous~ Mail, Orofino, ID 83544 
Douglas D Phelps 
Phelps & AssoCiates 
2903 North Stout Road 
Spokane,VVA 99260 
Mailed 
ORDER TO TRANSPORT - 2 
----------~~------------------------------------~~----~J~ 
:lte: 9/16/2008 
me: 03:37 PM 
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Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County 
Minutes Report 
Case: CR-2005-0000561 
Defendant: Lippert, Robert S 
Selected Items 
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End time: 10:03 AM 
Audio tape number: CD#293-2 
Prosecutor: Lori M. Gilmore 
Defense attorney: Peter C Jones 
Tape Counter: 959 
Tape Counter: 1001 
Tape Counter: 1015 
Tape Counter: 1043 
Tape Counter: 1054 
Tape Counter: 1056 
Tape Counter: 1103 
Tape Counter: 1105 
Tape Counter: 1106 
Tape Counter: 1111 
Tape Counter: 1133 
Tape Counter: 1152 
Tape Counter: 1154 
Court gives introductions, reviews proceedings held on 9/3/08 and the purpose of these 
proceedings is to conduct an inquiry as to whether Mr. Lippert had good cause to request 
a substitution of counsel on the 1 st day of the jury trial. 
Mr. Jones calls Robert Lippert, sworn in, testifies. 
Cross-examination by Ms. Gilmore. 
Re-direct by Mr. Jones. 
Re-cross by Ms. Gilmore. 
Court questions the witness. 
Ms. Gilmore questions the witness in light of the Court's questions. 
Mr. Jones questions the witness in light of the Court's questions. 
Ms. Gilmore calls John Hathaway, sworn in, testifies. 
Mr. Jones asks the Court have the witness identify the document he's referring to for his 
testimony. Mr. Hathaway advises it is a breakdown of his contacts with Mr. Lippert. Ms. 
Gilmore resumes questioning the witness. 
Cross-examination by Mr. Jones. 
Court questions the parties re: timeline for final briefing and responses and orders that Mr. 
Jones' brief is due by 10/3/08, Ms. Gilmore'S response is due by 10/17/08 and Mr. Jones 
will have 1 week to 10/24/08 to file any reply and the matter will be considered under 
advisement on 10/24/08. 
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CASE NO. CR-05-561 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
COMES NOW the above-entitled defendant, by and through his attorney of 
record PETER JONES of PHELPS AND ASSOCIATES, P.S., and hereby presents the 
following memorandum oflaw: 
I. FACTS 
.. The facts have largely been heard by this court. A brief summary follows: 
Mr. Lippert was incarcerated in the Clearwater County Jail at all times 
approaching his trial. He was represented by Mr. Hathaway, an appointed public 
defender, in pursuing this trial. Mr. Hathaway, on occasion, visited Mr. Lippert in the 
jail, normally after a hearing took place. He would not visit beforehand, leaving Mr. 
Lippert unprepared for the upcoming hearing. 
Mr. Hathaway did visit Mr. Lippert before the trial in mid-January, but did not 
speak to Mr. Lippert during that visit concerning the substance of the trial. The 
conversation revolved around the date of the trial and what Mr. Lippert would wear. 
Memorandum pg 1 of7 
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Prior to that, the last time Mr. Hathaway met with Mr. Lippert was following the 404(b) 
hearing in this case, and again Mr. Hathaway did not speak to Mr. Lippert concerning the 
substance of his case; rather Mr. Hathaway simply was "sure he knew" what was going 
on with his case, having sat through the 404(b) hearing. 
Mr. Lippert approached his trial without the advice of counsel, without any sort of 
preparation, and without knowing the basic procedures of a trial. He was of the 
impression that Mr. Hathaway would prepare him, and thus did not ask for substitute 
counsel until the day of trial; the only day on which Mr. Lippert could possibly know that 
Mr. Hathaway did not intend to prepare his client for trial. 
II. ISSUES 
Per the appellate court's decision, there are four (4) issues for'this court to 
consider in determining whether Mr. Lippert's request for an attorney was with good 
cause: 
. '1. Whether the defendant's motion for new counsel waS timely 
2. Whether the trial court adequately inquired into defendant's reasons for 
making the motion. 
3. Whether the defendant-attorney conflict was so great that it led to a total 
lack of communication precluding an adequate defense; and 
4. Whether the defendant substantially and unreasonably contributed to the 
communication breakdown. 
.state v. Lippert, 181 P.3d 512 at 523 (ID 2007), citing United States v. Loft, 310 
F.3d 1231,1250 (10th Cir.2002). 
Memorandum pg 1 of 7 
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m. ARGUMENT 
1. The defendant's motion for new counsel was made at the only time he possibly . 
could make it. 
It is true that the defendant made his motion for new counsel on the day of trial. 
It would be easy to leap to the conclusion that, because of this timing, Mr. Lippert's 
request for new counsel was untimely. 
To do that, however, overlooks the facts of the situation. Mr. Lippert was 
consistently of the impression that Mr. Hathaway would, at some point before trial, go 
over the trial with him. What Mr. Lippert needed most was communication from his 
attorney about what to do in a trial situation; those of us who have done trials may feel 
blase about them,. but we must never forget that, for our clients, it is a new and frightful 
experience, and that one of the primary functions of being an attorney is guiding our 
client through it. 
It was not until the moment where Mr. Lippert was taken in front of the court and 
told there was going to be a trial that Mr. Lippert had to come to grips with the fact that 
his attorney was not going to communicate with him regarding the trial. As a result, Mr. 
Lippert asked the court for a change of attorney. 
At what other time could Mr. Lippert have made this motion? In order to make it, 
he would have to predict that his attorney would completely fail to talk to him about the 
trial in the weeks leading up to the trial. Mr. Lippert made the motion as soon as he 
figured out that Mr. Hathaway was not interested in preparing him for trial.. He knew that 
Mr. Hathaway had a habit of not preparing him for trial, but he could not fathom (for it is 
difficult to fathom) ~.fI.~0l1!~Y ~9t~peaking to hll,n about afelonyjury trial . ......... _. ____ . ____ .. 
Memorandum pg 1 of 7 
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Even though it was made on the day of trial, Mr. Lippert's motion was made in as 
timely a fashion as possible. 
2. The court has now made a full inquiry. 
Following its initial failure to inquire, this court has now, pursuant to the 
instructions of the appellate court, made a full inquiry into Mr. Lippert's reason for 
requesting a new attorney. 
3. The defendant-attorney conflict was so great that it led to a total lack of 
communication precluding an adequate defense. 
For evidence of this, we need turn no farther than the fact that Mr. Hathaway, in 
the weeks leading up to the trial, did not prepare his client for trial in the least. The only 
communication Mr. Hathaway had with Mr. Lippert was regarding the date of the trial, 
and what Mr. Lippert should wear. There was no communication as to whether or not 
Mr. Lippert should testify. There was no communication regarding what witnesses 
would say what. Mr. Hathaway refused to come to the jail to speak to Mr. Lippert. 
Once trial began, Mr. Lippert attempted to re-instate contact by passing notes to 
. Mr. Hathaway. Mr. Hathaway and the state maintain that this note-passing was enough . 
communication for an adequate defense, but it is hard to understand how one-way 
communication from Mr. Lippert to Mr. Hathaway, with no communication back to Mr. 
Lippert, could possibly be considered sufficient to provide an adequate defense. 
There was a total lack of information flowing from Mr. Hathaway to Mr; Lippert, 
and therefore any infolTIlation flowing from Mr. Lippert to Mr. Hathaway was 
unconstrained by any knowledge or training with regard to the law. Mr. Hathaway 
Memorandum pg 1 of? 
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claimed on the stand that this was enough to provide an adequate defense, but given what 
we know about the information flow, this cannot be true. 
4. The defendant did not substantially and unreasonably contribute to the 
communication breakdown. 
Mr. Lippert was in the Clearwater County Jail. Communication happened at the 
whim of Mr. Hathaway, who chose not to contact his client. Noone doubts that Mr. 
Lippert is a little on the stubborn side, but this does not mean he contributed to a 
communications breakdown. 
In fact, Mr. Lippert tried constantly throughout these proceedings to continue to 
communicate with Mr. Hathaway. He informed Mr. Hathaway of potential witnesses, 
asked Mr. Hathaway questions, requested that Mr. Hathaway interview people to 
. determine their usefulness as witnesses. Mr. Lippert was constantly trying to 
communicate with Mr. Hathaway; he was limited only by his jail cell. 
Mr. Hathaway chose not to visit Mr. Lippert in the month before his trial. Mr . 
. .. ··Hathaway chose to restrict his conversation with Mr. Lippert just prior to trial to what 
Mr. Lippert was going to wear. Mr. Hathaway chose to assume that Mr. Lippert knew 
who was going to say what on the stand, and how that was going to be responded to. 
In short, the testimony is clear that the blame for the communications breakdown. 
between Mr. Hathaway and Mr. Lippert can be .laid squarely on Mr. Hathaway. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Given that analysis on all of these points renders good cause for Mr. Lippert's 
initial motion, that motion must be granted, and Mr. Lippert is entitled to a new trial as a 
result. 
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of October, 2008, 
Attorney for Defendant 
Memorandur:q. pg 1 of7 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true JWd COITec~\ foregoing to be 
delivered via method indicated below on this _~_ day of· 0 the following: 
Clearwater County District Court 
208-476-5159 - Fax 
Clearwater County Prosecuting Attorney 
208-476-9 - Fax 
T t 
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Prosecuting Attorney 
County of Clearwater 
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Chief Deputy: Lori M. Gilmore ISBN:5877 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 











CASE NO. CR-2005-561 
Plaintiff, 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
vs. 
ROBERT S. LIPPERT, 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This court is well aware of the facts that are at issue in the above-mentioned case. 
However, the State will address the facts that are pertinent to the issues addressed in 
memorandum. 
1. The defendant refused to dress or come to his trial on the morning of January 23, 
2003. He stated that he was unprepared, had a headache and did not realize that the 
trial had been scheduled on this date The defendant had received both written 
notice and notice in open court of the trial date scheduled for January 23,2005. 
MEMORANDUM 
Mr. Lippert requested that other counsel be appointed for him. 
The Court required Mr. Lippert to come to trial. The defendant did dress and come 
to trial and participated in his defense by writing notes to his counsel, and 
testifying on his own behalf The defendant was convicted and a sentencing date 
was set. 
2. The defendant was not prepared for the sentencing and requested a continuance. He 
also represented himself with assistance of his court appointed attorney, John R. 
Hathaway. The defendant consulted with John Hathaway throughout the 
sentencing hearing. 
3. The defendant was not prepared for the first hearing scheduled in this current 
matter. He requested a continuance. 
4. In the hearing that was held on September 15, 2008, in this current matter the 
defendant claims that his reasons for requesting substitute counsel were as follows: 
- That the defendant had a conflict with Mr. Hathaway because of a previous 
representation of a family member and because Mr. Hathaway had represented the 
defendants business partner in a proceeding against him. During the hearing Mr. 
Hathaway testified that he did not know the family member referred to by the 
defendant and that he had never represented the defendant's business partner in any 
actions against the defendant. In fact, Mr. Hathaway testified he did not know the 
MEMORANDUM 
defendant prior to his representation in this case. 
-That the defendant did not know that he was going to trial on January 23,2005 
and that Mr. Hathaway did not sufficiently prepare for that trial, and 
- That there was a break down in communication between himself and Mr. 
Hathaway. 
5. Mr. Hathaway testified at the hearing held on this matter to the following: 
- That he had met with the defendant on 13 separate occasions during the 
defendant's incarceration in the Clearwater County Jail. That during those 
meetings Mr. Hathaway had provided discovery to the defendant and discussed that 
discovery with him. 
- That Mr. Hathaway had prepared and argued Motions in Limine and contested the 
states proffer of 404 b evidence and cross examined several witnesses in a hearing 
on that matter. 
-That Mr. Hathaway discussed potential witnesses with the defendant, that he 
interviewed witnesses, found witnesses and discussed the problems with their 
potential testimony. 
-That Mr. Hathaway had discussions with the defendant about whether or not the 
defendant would testify on his own behalf and prepared him to do so. 
-That the defendant and Mr. Hathaway communicated during the trial and that the 
MEMORANDUM 
defendant assisted Mr. Hathaway in his defense. 
- Mr. Hathaway cross-examined the state's witnesses and put on a defense to the 
charges. 
-That Mr. Lippert consulted and communicated with Mr. Hathaway during the 
sentencing hearing. 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the defendant's motion for new counsel was timely; 
·2. Whether the trial court adequately inquired into defendant's reasons for making the 
motion; 
3. Whether the defendant-attorney conflict was so great that it led to a total lack of 
communication precluding an adequate defense; and 
4. Whether the defendant substantially and unreasonably contributed to the 
communication break down. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether or not to appoint substitute counsel is within the sound discretion of the trial 
judge. "The standard of review is an abuse of discretion standard, found when the denial of the 





Defendant's Motion for New Counsel Was Not Timely 
Mr. Lippert made the motion for new counsel that is being considered by this court on the 
morning of trial. The state argues that this motion was meant to delay the trial and was untimely. 
The Court Has Made an Inquiry Into the Defendant's Reasons for Requesting New Counsel 
This court held a hearing on September 15, 2008, and conducted a full inquiry into the 
issues addressed by the Idaho Court of Appeals regarding the Defendant's request for substitution 
of Counsel. 
The Defendant-Attorney Conflict Was Not so Great That it Led a Total Lack of 
Communication 
After this Court denied Mr. Lippert's motion for new counsel, the trial was conducted, as 
scheduled. The defendant communicated with his attorney by notes and they spoke during breaks 
from the trial. Jack Hathaway cross-examined the state's witnesses, made objections to the state's 
questioning at trial and presented a defense, including calling the defendant as a witness. 
The Idaho Court of appeals in its decision in this instant case, cited State v. Doe#l 272 
F.3d 116, 123(2nd Cir.2001), which was a case that analyzed the four factors to be applied by this 
court. The Doe court found that the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint 
substitute counsel. Doe involved a defendant who had two previous attorneys. The defendant's 
MEMORANDUM 
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first attorney was appointed; the defendant then retained counsel who subsequently withdrew, 
claiming that the defendant would not communicate with him. The trial court appointed a second 
public defender. This public defender made two separate motions to withdraw as counsel. The 
defendant made one pro se motion for new counsel and joined the defense attorney on one of the 
motions to with withdraw. The trial court denied all of these motions. On the day of trial, defense 
counsel requested that his client be shackled during the trial because the defendant had to be 
restrained from hitting him the night before, the defendant had made a shooting gesture at the 
attorney and the defendant had threatened the defendant's family. 
The Doe court found that the attorney client relationship had not broken down to the point 
as to prevent communication. Specifically the Court stated: 
... While the rift between Findley and Stapleton was at times intense as a result of Findley's 
violent and aggressive nature, the conflict between the two was not '" so great that it ... 
resulted in total lack of communication preventing adequate defense. '" The record reveals 
that Findley and Stapleton did communicate prior to and during the course of the trial. 
Even after the district court repeatedly denied his withdrawal motions and after Stapleton 
expressed fear for his own and his family's safety, Stapleton carried out his duties as 
Findley's counsel by, for example, (1) filing no less than nine motions in limine'(2) 
initially attempting to dissuade Findley from testifying, (3) arguing before the court once 
Findley insisted on testifying, as to the admissibility of Findley's prior felony drug 
conviction, (4) cross-examining witnesses, and (5) making numerous objections to the 
government's questioning during the trial. Further, the district court credited Stapleton's 
statements that he had given Findley the discovery provided by the government, met with 
Findley to discuss strategy, and despite the conflict, was willing to continue representing 
Findley during trial. Based on these facts, we cannot say that the conflict between Findley 
and Stapleton prevented an adequate defense. Doe at 124 
Given the relationship that existed in the Doe case, it is apparent that the attorney-client 
relationship that existed in the case at bar between Mr. Hathaway and the defendant Mr. Lippert 
did not rise to the standard that is required. Mr. Hathaway presented the defendant with discovery 
MEMORANDUM 
met with the defendant to go over the discovery, filed motions on behalf of the defendant, 
discussed witnesses testimony and located and interviewed witnesses on behalf of the defendant, 
discussed whether or not the defendant would testify on his own behalf. The defendant and Mr. 
Hathaway communicated throughout the trial and the defendant, communicated with Mr. 
Hathaway during the sentencing hearing. There was not a sufficient break down of 
communication so as to deprive the defendant of counsel. 
The Defendant substantially and unreasonably contributed to the communication break 
Mr. Hathaway visited with the Defendant on thirteen separate occasions during the 
defendant's incarceration with three ofthose visits occurring during the month preceding the trial. 
Mr. Hathaway interviewed witnesses and discussed this with the defendant. Mr. Hathaway 
testified that the defendant was very difficult to deal with and would not discuss anything except 
that he did not do what was alleged. The Defendant's current counsel, in his memorandum 
admits that "Mr. Lippert is a little on the stubborn side." Even this court has experienced the 
defendant's proclivity to control situations. This court had to have the defendant brought into 
court on the day of his trial because the defendant refused to come into the courtroom 
Mr. Lippert, due to his controlling personality and behavior was the source of any breakdown in 
communications. 
Conclusion 
It is within the sound discretion of this court to refuse the defendant's motion for new 
MEMORANDUM 
counsel and based on the preceding analysis it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to 
deny the defendant's motion 
. ..-/ 
DATED this ;Lot' day of October, 2008 
~-Gtf}; ~L ~ M. Gllfuore ... 
Deputy Prosecutor 
MEMORANDUM 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
was served upon Peter ~ones Phelps & Associates, PS Attorneys at Law by fascimile transmission 
o 's ~ day 0 etober 2008 
.r::::-
Peter Jones 
Phelps & Associates, PS 
Attorneys At Law 
2903 North Stout 
Spokane, W A 99206 
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CASE NO. CR 2005-561 
:MEMORANDUM OPINION 
AND ORDER ON REMAND 
TO DETERMINE MOTION 
FOR SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL 
This matter came before the Court on remand from the Court of Appeals of the State of 
Idaho. Peter Jones, of the fIrm Phelps & Associates, represented the Defendant, Robert S. 
Lippert. The State ofIdaho was represented by Lori Gilmore, Clearwater County Chief Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney. A hearing was held on this matter on September 15,2008. Supplementary 
briefs were filed by counsel in the weeks following the hearing. The Court, having heard the 
argument of counsel and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision. 
BACKGROUND 
The Defendant, Robert Lippert, was charged with sexual abuse of a minor under the age 
of sixteen, to which a jury found him guilty as charged. Mr. Lippert was represented by a public 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 1 
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defender throughout the proceedings, until sentencing, at which time Lippert represented himself 
with the same public defender available on standby. 
At a pre-trial hearing on November 16,2005, Mr. Lippert requested that his public 
defender be replaced by different court appointed counsel, and this court denied the request. I A 
pretrial motion hearing was held on January 6,2006. During this hearing, the same appointed 
counsel represented the Defendant and counsel effectively argued the motion in the matter, which 
was of a complicated nature. During this time, there was a brief discussion between court and 
counsel about a potential substitute public defender taking the case, however, a motion for 
substitution of counsel was not considered at that time. 
A jury trial on the matter was scheduled to begin on the morning of January 23, 2006. On 
the morning of the day of trial, Mr. Lippert refused to exit his jail cell and was brought into the 
courtroom by jail staff in his jail clothing because he had refused to change. Mr. Lippert claimed 
he was unaware that the trial was scheduled for that day, and that he had an extreme headache. 
Colloquy was held on the record between this Court and Mr. Lippert. At this time, Mr. Lippert 
once again raised his concerns about counsel. While this Court allowed Mr. Lippert to express 
his concerns on the record, the Court did not extensively question Mr. Lippert on his request for 
new counsel. Having reviewed the matter, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to this Court 
in order that a meaningful inquiry be held to determine whether Mr. Lippert possessed good 
cause for his request for substitute counsel on the morning of the first day of trial. 
A hearing on the issue of substitute counsel was originally scheduled for August 27, 
2008. On that date, Mr. Lippert was not prepared to go forward on the matter, as he had lost his 
1 The facts of this case show that Mr. Lippert requested substitute counsel on two occasions. The Court of Appeals 
has directed this Court to consider only whether the defendant should have been granted substitute counsel when he 
made the request on the morning of his trial. 
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notes while in transit to Clearwater County. Mr. Lippert also informed the Court that counsel 
would be representing him, but that counsel was not available immediately at the time of hearing. 
The matter was then rescheduled for September 15,2008, at which time the Court conducted its 
inquiry into Mr. Lippert's request for substitute counsel. During this inquiry Mr. Lippert took the 
stand and was questioned by counsel and the court. Following Mr. Lippert's testimony, the 
public defender took the stand and was questioned by counsel and the court. 
ANALYSIS 
This Court has been directed to conduct a meaningful inquiry to determine whether Mr. 
Lippert possessed good cause for his request for substitute counsel on the morning of the first day 
of trial. "Good cause includes an actual conflict of interest; a complete, irrevocable breakdown 
of communication; or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict. State 
v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 596-97, 181 P.3d 512,522-23 (Ct. App. 2007), citing Smith v. 
Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing cases); McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 
931 (2ndCir. 1981). See also UnitedStatesv. Loft, 310 F.3d 1231,1250 (10thCir. 2002). "If 
good cause is shown, the defendant is constitutionally entitled to the appointment of new 
counsel." ld., see State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960,964 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Further, "[i]n 
evaluating good cause, a trial court should also consider whether the request for substitute 
counsel was timely.,,2 State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 597,181 P.3d 512, 523 (Ct. App. 2007), 
citing State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 277,61 P.3d 632,634 (Ct. App. 2002). 
2 In State v. Reber, the Idaho Court of Appeals determined a motion for self-representation was timely if it is made 
prior to the commencement of meaningful trial proceedings. ld at 277,61 P.3d at 634. Mr. Lippert's request for 
substitute counsel came before the commencement of the trial in the case at hand, therefore the motion was timely. 
Because the motion was timely made, this Court must determine whether Mr. Lippert set forth good cause for the 
substitution of counsel. 
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Based upon this Court's observation of the proceedings in this matter, and the inquiry 
made by this Court and counsel at the hearing held on September, 15,2008, this Court 
determines that Mr. Lippert did not have good cause for his request for substitute counsel on the 
morning of the fIrst day of trial. This Court will address individually the aspects of good cause 
as set forth by the Court of Appeals in State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho at 596, 181 P.3d at 522. 
1. Did an actual conflict of interest exist between Lippert and his appointed counsel? 
Good cause for a substitution of counsel may be established if an actual conflict of 
interest existed between counsel and the defendant. The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct set 
forth conflicts of interest in the practice of law in Rules 1.7 through 1.11. Rule 1. 7 (b) allows an 
actual or potential conflict to be waived by the client. Conflicts of interest were discussed in 
detail in State v. Lopez, 139 Idaho 256, 77 P.3d 124 (Ct. App. 2003). 
"An actual or potential conflict cannot be waived if, in the circumstances 
of the case, the conflict is of such a serious nature that no rational defendant 
would knowingly and intelligently desire that attorney's representation. United 
States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76, 95 (2nd Cir.2002). Conflicts can be divided into 
those which implicate the attorneys own self-interest and those which implicate 
the attorneys ethical obligation to someone other than the defendant, and the 
former are often mote serious than the latter. See Schwarz, 283 F.3d at 96; United 
States v. Fulton,S F.3d 605,609 (2nd Cir.1993). 
Id. at 260, 77 P.3d at 128. 
During this Court's inquiry regarding substitution of counsel, Mr. Lippert made reference 
to two circumstances which may have created an actual conflict of interest between Mr. Lippert 
and his appointed counsel. First, Mr. Lippert claimed that appointed counsel had represented Mr. 
Lippert's aunt in her divorce during the early seventies and late eighties. 3 Appointed counsel 
3 While testifying regarding his aunt, Mr. Lippert could not remember the exact time of her divorce proceedings and 
instead gave a large window oftime when the divorce may have occurred. Regardless of the date, it appears the 
divorce occurred prior to the time that appointed counsel began practicing law in Idaho. 
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testified that he did not recognize the name of the aunt and that he did not begin the practice of 
law in Idaho until 1987. Based upon this testimony, this Court is not convinced that an actual 
conflict of interest existed regarding Mr. Lippert's aunt. 
Mr. Lippert also alluded to a conflict of interest regarding appointed counsel's 
representation of Mr. Lippert's former business partner. Mr. Lippert claimed that appointed 
counsel represented this business partner in a property dispute against Mr. Lippert. LR.P.C. 
1. 7(a)(I) prohibits representation of a client if "the representation of one client will be directly 
adverse to another client. ... " LR.P.C. 17(a)(l). Appointed counsel did testify he had 
represented the business partner with regard to a wage claim that loggers had made, but not in 
any property issues. The representation happened sixteen or seventeen years in the past. Based 
upon this representation, Mr. Lippert has not established that an actual conflict of interest existed 
which prohibited appointed counsel from representing Mr. Lippert in the underlying criminal 
matter. Thus, good cause for substitution of counsel has not been established based upon an 
actual conflict of interest. 
2. Was there a complete, irrevocable breakdown of communication between Lippert and 
his appointed counsel? 
This Court must consider whether a complete, irrevocable breakdown in communication 
occurred between Mr. Lippert and appointed counsel, creating good cause for the substitution of 
counsel on the first day of trial. Factors to be used in examining a total breakdown of 
communication are set forth in United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231 (lOth Cir. 2002). See also 
State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 597, 181 P.3d 512,523 (Ct. App. 2007). The Court must 
consider: 
1) whether the defendant's motion for new counsel was timely; 2) whether the 
trial court adequately inquired into defendant's reasons for making the motion; 3) 
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whether the defendant-attorney conflict was so great that it led to a total lack of 
communication precluding an adequate defense; and 4) whether the defendant 
substantially and unreasonably contributed to the communication breakdown. 
Id. at 1250. Whether the motion was timely4 and whether the trial court adequately inquired into 
the defendant's reasons for making the motionS need not be considered in great detail. However, 
in order to determine whether there was good cause for substitution of counsel, this Court must 
consider the last two factors set forth in Lott; whether the defendant-attorney conflict was so 
great that it led to a total lack of communication precluding an adequate defense and whether the 
defendant substantially and unreasonably contributed to the communication breakdown. Each 
issue will be addressed below. 
a. Whether the defendant-attorney conflict was so great that it led to a total lack of 
communication precluding an adequate defense. 
Mr. Lippert claims that there was a total lack of communication which precluded him 
from being provided an adequate defense at trial. First, Mr. Lippert argues that appointed 
counsel failed to communicate with him prior to trial which resulted in Mr. Lippert being unable 
4 The Idaho Court of Appeals considered whether a motion for self-representation was timely in State v. Reber, l38 
Idaho 275, 61 P.3d 632 (Ct. App. 2002). 
A motion for self-representation is timely if made prior to the commencement of meaningful trial 
proceedings. Oakey, 853 F.2d at 553; Smith, 780 F.2d at 811; Fritz v. Spalding, 682 F.2d 782, 
784 (9th Cir.1982). Empanelment of a jury is a meaningful trial proceeding; thus, a motion for 
self-representation after jury empanelment is untimely. See Us. v. Schaff, 948 F.2d 501, 503 (9th 
Cir.l991); Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 888 (9th Cir.1990); Smith, 780 F.2d at 811; Fritz, 682 
F.2d at 784. 
Id at 277,61 P.3d at 634. While inconvenient, this Court recognizes that Mr. Lippert's requests came prior to the 
empanelment of a jury in the trial proceedings. A jury panel had been sununoned, and potential jurors were waiting 
in the courthouse, but proceedings to empanel a jury had not begun at the time Mr. Lippert refused to exit his j ail 
cell. Thus, this Court determines that Mr. Lippert's request was timely because it occurred prior to the 
commencement of a meaningful trial proceeding. However, the timeliness of the motion, standing alone, does not 
establish that there was good cause for substitution of counsel. Because the motion was timely, the Court must 
consider the other factors set forth in Lott in order to determine whether there was good cause for the substitution of 
counsel in the case at hand. 
S The second factor set forth in Lou is whether the trial court adequately inquired into defendant's reasons for 
making the motion for substitute counsel. Lott, 310 F.3d at 1250. As required by the Court of Appeals, a hearing 
was held to conduct a meaningful inquiry to determine whether Lippert possessed good cause for his request for 
substitute counsel. At this hearing, Mr. Lippert was provided the opportunity to present his reasons for requesting 
counsel, accordingly, it is not necessary for this Court to address the second factor from Lott in detail. 
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to determine whether he should testify, or being aware of the information witnesses would 
provide in their testimony.6 Mr. Lippert asserts that appointed counsel refused to come to the jail 
to speak with him. Finally, Mr. Lippert asserted that his only communication with appointed 
counsel was via note-passing during the trial, which was one-way communication at best. 
"The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that he has a genuine irreconcilable 
conflict with counselor that there has been a total breakdown in communications." State v. 
Torres, 208 Ariz. 340, 343, 93 P.3d 1056, 1059 (2004). Guidance on whether a total breakdown 
in communication occurred between a defendant and appointed counsel can also be found in 
United States v. Lott, 310 U.S. 1231 (lOth Cir. 2002). 
[A hearing helps] a court determine whether an attorney-client conflict rises to the 
level of a ''total breakdown in communication" or instead whether the conflict is 
insubstantial or a mere "disagreement about trial strategy [that] does not require 
substitution of counsel." United States v. Taylor, 128 F.3d 1105, 1110 (7th 
Cir.1997). The types of communication breakdowns that constitute "total 
breakdowns" defy easy defInition, and to our knowledge no court or commentator 
has put forth a precise defInition. As a general matter, however, we believe that to 
prove a total breakdown in communication, a defendant must put forth evidence 
of a severe and pervasive conflict with his attorney or evidence that he had such 
minimal contact with the attorney that meaningful communication was not 
possible. 
Id. at 1249. 
An example of a situation which may have created in a total breakdown in 
communication is discussed in United States v. John Doe #1,272 F.3d 116 (2nd Cir. 2001). In 
this case, the Court determined that a total breakdown in communication had not occurred, even 
though court appointed counsel had initially motioned to withdraw based upon his concerns of 
threats made by his client. The trial court in John Doe initially denied the motion to withdraw, 
6 While Mr. Lippert claims to not be aware of the potential testimony of witnesses, many of these witnesses testified 
at the pretrial hearing regarding LR.E. 404(b) evidence. Mr. Lippert was in attendance with counsel at this hearing. 
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but as the time for trial grew near, the trial court held a hearing on the Defendant's pro se motion 
for substitution of counsel. 
Findley submitted a pro se motion to relieve Stapleton as trial counsel alleging 
that Stapleton harbored bad faith and failed to discuss defense strategies with 
Findley. The district court held a hearing on Findley's motion, during which 
Findley argued that there was a "conflict of interest" between him and Stapleton 
because Stapleton had repeatedly lied to him. In response, Stapleton indicated that 
he had had no communication with Findley since Findley's last appearance in 
court. Stapleton further stated that he had provided Findley with all discovery 
(which Findley disputed) and had given Findley a "candid estimation" of how the 
trial would proceed and end. Stapleton also described Findley's aggressiveness 
toward him, but expressed his willingness to continue to represent Findley, since 
he believed that Findley would act similarly with any other attorney. 
Id. at 120-21. Defendant Findley had made threats of physical violence to both counsel and his 
family in the past. Based -upon the hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant's motion. Upon 
review, the trial court's determination was upheld, based upon the following reasoning: 
[W]hile the rift between Findley and Stapleton was at times intense as a result of 
Findley's violent and aggressive nature, the conflict between the two was not" 'so 
great that it ... resulted in total lack of communication preventing an adequate 
defense.' " Simeonov, 252 F.3d at 241 (quoting Morrissey, 461 F.2d at 670). The 
record reveals that Findley and Stapleton did communicate prior to and during the 
course of the trial. Even after the district court repeatedly denied his withdrawal 
motions and after Stapleton expressed fear for his own and his family's safety, 
Stapleton carried out his duties as Findley's counsel by, for example, (l) filing no 
less than nine motions in limine; (2) initially attempting to dissuade Findley from 
testifying, (3) arguing before the court, once Findley insisted on testifying, as to 
the admissibility of Findley's prior felony drug conviction, (4) cross-examining 
witnesses, and (5) making numerous objections to the government's questioning 
during the trial. Despite the conflict between Findley and Stapleton, it is clear that 
the two communicated in presenting Findley's defense. Further, the district court 
credited Stapleton's statements that he had given Findley the discovery provided 
by the Government, met with Findley to discuss strategy, and, despite the conflict, 
was willing to continue representing Findley during trial. Based on these facts, we 
cannot say that the conflict between Findley and Stapleton prevented an adequate 
defense. 
[d. at 124. 
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The rift between counsel and the defendant in John Doe was of a more tumultuous nature 
than the rift between counsel and Mr. Lippert in the case at hand. Even so, the John Doe Court 
determined that a total breakdown in communication had not occurred. 
The case at hand is also similar to McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927 (2nd Cir. 1981), 
another case where the reviewing court upheld the trial court's determination that substitution of 
counsel was not warranted. The McKee Court determined that the defendant's arguments that a 
fundamental disruption of the integrity of the attorney-client relationship did not rise to the level 
of a total breakdown in communication. 
The grounds that McKee raised for substitution of counsel were that Occhetti had 
"prejudged" him and informed him that his chances of acquittal were slim. In 
addition, McKee suggests that Occhetti actually discussed with the prosecutor the 
fact of McKee's guilt. McKee argues that, regardless of whether these allegations 
are true, the resulting loss of trust wrought a "fundamental disruption of the 
integrity of the attorney-client relationship." Appellant's Br. at 8. Thus, the 
argument goes, there was a "complete breakdown in communication" which 
warranted the eleventh-hour substitution, despite the potential for delay and 
disruption of the ongoing trial. We find these contentions to be merit1ess. 
ld at 931 -9321.7 Similar complaints were made by Mr. Lippert in the case before this Court. 
Based upon the hearing held on this matter, this Court is not persuaded that the Defendant has 
met his burden of establishing that a total breal(down of communication occurred between 
himself and appointed counsel. 
At the hearing on this matter, Mr. Lippert testified regarding whether there was a total 
breakdown of communication between himself and appointed counsel. Mr. Lippert claimed he 
wrote several notes to counsel over a period of six months, but that counsel failed to reply to any 
7 A comprehensive list of cases of a similar nature, involving the total breakdown of communication between a client 
and appointed counsel is available at H.D. W., Annotation, Right of Defendant in Criminal Case to Discharge of or 
Substitution of Other Counsel for, Attorney Appointed by Court to Represent Him, 157 A.L.R. 1225 (originally 
printed in 1945, updated weekly). 
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of the questions posed in the notes. :Mr. Lippert also claims he never received assistance to 
research laws. :Mr. Lippert claimed that counsel failed to prepare him for trial, and that he was 
not informed even of the actual date of trial. 8 :Mr. Lippert also claimed that he did not know prior 
to trial that he would be called to testify, and that it was his belief that the Court coerced him into 
testifying. Mr. Lippert also claimed that key witnesses were not called at the trial. Mr. Lippert 
did admit, during the recent hearing, that appointed counsel did visit him at the jail, usually after 
a hearing had taken place in court. 
Appointed counsel also testified at the hearing, first explaining procedural matters that 
happened during the course of the proceedings which led to trial. Appointed counsel explained 
the process of disqualifying the judge originally assigned to the case. Next, appointed counsel 
explained that he was appointed to represent :Mr. Lippert in several matters, not just the charges 
that were tried in this case at hand. Several warrants were issued on these other matters, and 
charges on other issues were dismissed because the statute of limitations had expired. Appointed 
counsel testified that he spoke with the Defendant prior to and after the preliminary hearing. He 
provided the Defendant with all the information that had been obtained in discovery. Appointed 
counsel filed motions in limine on behalf of the Defendant and participated in complex pretrial 
hearings on these motions. Appointed counsel tracked down two witnesses from out of state at 
the request of the Defendant, however, he elected to not subpoena these witnesses after the 
Defendant claimed they would just lie about the situation anyway. Appointed counsel explained 
that Mr. Lippert was difficult to communicate with because he claimed the victim in the case was 
just lying about what had happened. Appointed counsel did claim that communication had 
8 While Mr. Lippert claimed to be unaware of the actual date of triaL he was present in Court during all pretrial 
proceedings, and the date of the trial was stated during these proceedings, therefore this argument does not support 
Mr. Lippert's claims that appointed counsel failed to communicate with him. . 
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broken down following the pretrial motion hearing regarding I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, but even so, 
counsel had visited Defendant prior to the trial and that Defendant was aware of the trial date. 
He also discussed with Mr. Lippert his right to not testify at trial, and communicated with the 
Defendant at trial after he elected to testify. Appointed counsel provided an adequate defense at 
trial, providing opening and closing statements, cross-examination of witnesses, presentation of 
witnesses on Mr. Lippert's behalf, and made appropriate objections during testimony. 
Considering the matter in total, this Court is not convinced that there was a total 
breakdown of communication between Mr. Lippert and appointed counsel. Mr. Lippert failed to 
provide evidence of a severe or pervasive conflict with counsel, nor did he establish that he had 
such minimal contact that meaningful communication was not possible. Therefore, good cause 
for the motion for substitution of counsel has not been established on the basis that there was a 
total breakdown of communication. 
b. Whether the defendant substantially and unreasonably contributed to the 
communication breakdown. 
This Court has determined that there was not a total breakdown of communication 
between Mr. Lippert and appointed counsel which precluded an adequate defense at trial. 
However, in order to provide a complete analysis, this Court will discuss whether the defendant 
substantially and unreasonably contributed to any communication brealcdown that may have 
occurred between himself and appointed counsel, based upon the factors provided in United 
States v. Lott, 310 F .3d at 1250. 
If a defendant requests substitution of counsel, he may not rely on his own actions to 
establish good cause for the motion. "A defendant may not, however, manufacture good cause 
by abusive or uncooperative behavior." State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 597, 181 P.3d 512, 523 
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(Ct. App. 2007), citing United States v. John Doe #1, 272 F.3d at 123. Several cases address the 
impact of a defendant's own actions with regard to whether substitute counsel should be 
appointed. See Tuitt v. Fair, 882 F.2d 166 (1st Cir. 1987)(1ast minute request to substitute 
counsel should not be allowed to become a vehicle for achieving delay); United States v. 
Andrews, 754 F.Supp. 1195 (N.D. Ill. 1990)(disagreements between appointed counsel and 
defendant over trial strategy and impetuous relationship do not amount to a conflict necessitating 
substitution); United States v. Birrell, 286 F.Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); United States v. 
Morsley, 64 F.3d 907 (4th Cir. 1995).9 Further, the Defendant's last minute request for 
substitution of counsel should not be allowed to become a vehicle for achieving delay. 
A defendant's belated request for substitution of counsel is granted only where 
there exists "good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown of 
communication or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust 
verdict." McKee, 649 F.2d at 931 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
See also Schmidt, 105 F .3d at 89 ("On the eve of trial, just as during trial, a 
defendant can only substitute new counsel when unusual circumstances are found 
to exist, such as·a complete breakdown of communication or an irreconcilable 
conflict"); United States v. Llanes, 374 F.2d 712, 717 (2d Cir.1967) ("Judges must 
be vigilant that requests for appointment of a new attorney on the eve of trial 
should not become a vehicle for achieving delay"). Although a defendant's "loss 
of trust" should be considered when assessing whether good cause for the 
substitution of assigned counsel exists, the defendant "must nevertheless afford 
the court with legitimate reasons for the lack of confidence." McKee, 649 F.2d at 
932. 
Latterell v. Conway, 430 F.Supp.2d 116, 123 (W.D.N.Y. 2006). 
In the case at hand, Mr. Lippert substantially contributed to the breakdown in 
communication between himself and counsel, and his request for substitution of counsel made on 
the morning of trial was simply a tactic for delaying the trial proceedings. This Court finds that 
Mr. Lippert's actions did not rise to the level of egregious, threatening, abusive and 
9 A comprehensive list of similar cases is located at 157 A.L.R. 1225. 
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uncooperative behavior as compared to the defendant in United States v. John Doe #1, 272 F.3d 
116 (2nd Cir. 2001), which was discussed in detail above. Nonetheless, Mr. Lippert failed to 
engage in meaningful communication with appointed counsel in a manner to best aid in his 
defense. Appointed counsel stated that Mr. Lippert was difficult to deal with and would not 
discuss the case in more detail than to state that he did not do what was alleged or express his 
beliefs that the victim and witnesses were lying. Counsel tracked down two witnesses at Mr. 
Lippert's request, but once they were located Mr. Lippert decided they would lie about the facts 
surrounding the charges against him. Even though Mr. Lippert complained that appointed 
counsel would not visit him at the jail, Mr. Lippert did concede that appointed counsel had come 
to the jail after hearings. Based upon this Court's own observations and the testimony provided 
at the recent hearing, this Court is not persuaded that the fault for a possible lack of 
communication should be laid squarely on appointed counsel alone, but that Mr. Lippert 
substantially contributed to any breakdown of communication by his own actions. 
Having reviewed the factors set out in United States v. Lott, this Court is unpersuaded 
that a complete, irrevocable breakdown of communication occurred in the case at hand, thus, 
good cause for substitution of counsel on the morning of trial was not established. The Court 
finds that while communication between appointed counsel and Mr. Lippert was difficult, it had 
not irretrievably and completely broken down to the point that Mr. Lippert could not aid in his 
own defense. Further, Mr. Lippert substantially contributed to the difficulty of communicating 
through his own actions. Therefore, the Defendant has not established good cause for the motion 
for substitution of counsel on the morning of trial. 
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3. Did an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict exist in this 
matter? 
Lastly, good cause for the substitution of counsel may be established if an irreconcilable 
conflict leads to an apparently unjust verdict. This issue was not argued by the Defendant in 
briefing, nevertheless, the Court will address this issue in determining whether good cause 
existed for the substitution of counsel in this case. An irreconcilable conflict which lead to an 
apparently unjust verdict was discussed in Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970). In 
this case, a dispute arose almost immediately between the defendant and his assigned counsel. 
The defendant filed four motions for substitution of counsel, all of which were denied by the trial 
court without inquiry. ld. at 1169. The defendant "was forced into a trial with the assistance of a 
particular lawyer with whom he was dissatisfied, with whom he would not cooperate, and with 
whom he would not, in any manner whatsoever, communicate." ld. The reviewing court 
determined that the attorney was understandably deprived of the power to present an adequate 
defense on the defendant's behalf due to the complete lack of communication. ld. The 
defendant was found guilty by jury of first degree murder, and the trial judge promptly reduced 
the offense to murder in the second degree. ld. The reviewing court found, however, that it was 
"not unreasonable to believe that had Brown been represented by counsel in whom he had 
confidence he would have been convicted, if at all, of no more than the offense of manslaughter." 
fd. at 1170. Clearly, in Brown v. Craven, the irreconcilable conflict between counsel and the 
defendant resulted in an unjust verdict of first degree murder. 
In the case at hand, there is no suggestion that the verdict reached was an unjust verdict. 
This case is distinguishable from Brown. First, in Brown, there was no communication in any 
manner between counsel and client almost immediately, as a result of a conflict that occurred 
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shortly after counsel's appointment to the case. The same cannot be said in the case at hand. 
Further, it was clear that the trial judge in Brown was convinced immediately that an unjust 
verdict had been reached by the jury, and the trial judge promptly reduced the verdict to murder 
in the second degree. 10 There is no such disparity in the verdict determined by the jury in the 
case before this Court. Therefore, good cause for substitution of counsel cannot be based upon 
an argument that there was an irreconcilable conflict which led to an apparently unjust verdict. 
This Court has reviewed whether Mr. Lippert possessed good cause for his request for 
substitute counsel on the morning of the first day of trial. The Court has considered, first, 
whether there was an actual conflict of interest; second, whether there was a complete, 
irrevocable breakdown of communication; and third, whether there was an irreconcilable conflict 
which lead to an apparently unjust verdict. Finding good cause absent, this Court determines that 
a substitution of counsel was not warranted on the morning of the first day of triaL 
CONCLUSION 
On remand, this Court was required to conduct a meaningful inquiry to determine 
whether Mr. Lippert possessed good cause for his request for substitute counsel on the morning 
of the first day of his criminal trial. A hearing was held on the matter and briefs were submitted 
in the weeks following the hearing. This Court reviewed whether good cause was established 
based on whether there was an actual conflict of interest; whether there was a complete 
irrevocable breakdown of communication; or whether there was an irreconcilable conflict which 
10 The Brown Court reversed judgment and remanded for a new trial. The trial court was directed to "grant Brown a 
new trial attended with all reasonable assurance that he be represented by competent counsel, from the Public 
Defender's office or elsewhere, in whom he may, ifhe does not demonstrate obstinance, recalcitrance, or 
unreasonable contumacy, repose his confidence." Id. at 1170. 
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lead to an apparently unjust verdict. For the foregoing reasons, this Court determines that good 
cause did not exist for the substitution of counsel. 
ORDER 
On remand, it is determined that the Defendant's Motion for Substitution of Counsel is 
hereby DENIED. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED. 
Dated this ~&Jay of November 2008. 
CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge 
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CASE NO. CR 2005-561 
ORDER VACATING AND 
REENTERING 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
AND ORDER ON REMAND 
TO DETERMINE MOTION 
FOR SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL 
Based on the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions oflaw, and Order on Petition 
for Post Conviction Relief in Clearwater County case number CV09-00 194 the Court 
hereby orders that the Memorandum Opinion and Order on Remand to Determine Motion 
for Substitute Counsel be VACATED and REENTERED. 
This matter came before the Court on remand from the Court of Appeals of the 
State ofIdaho. Peter Jones, of the fIrm Phelps & Associates, represented the Defendant, 
Robert S. Lippert. The State of Idaho was represented by Lori Gilmore, Clearwater 
County Chief Deputy Prosecuting Attorney. A hearing was held on this matter on 
September 15, 2008. Supplementary briefs were fIled by counsel in the weeks following 
the hearing. The Court, having head the argument of counsel and being fully advised in 
the matter, hereby renders its decision. 
BACKGROUND 
The Defendant, Robert Lippert, was charged with sexual abuse of a minor under 
the age of sixteen, to which ajury found him guilty as charged. Mr. Lippert was 
represented by a public 
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defender throughout the proceedings, until sentencing, at which time Lippert represented himself 
with the same public defender available on standby. 
At a pre-trial hearing on November 16, 2005, Mr. Lippert requested that his public 
defender be replaced by different court appointed counsel, and this court denied the request.! A 
pretrial motion hearing was held on January 6,2006. During this hearing, the same appointed 
counsel represented the Defendant and counsel effectively argued the motion in the matter, which 
was of a complicated nature. During this time, there was a brief discussion between court and 
counsel about a potential substitute public defender taking the case, however, a motion for 
substitution of counsel was not considered at that time. 
A jury trial on the matter was scheduled to begin on the morning of January 23,2006. On 
the morning of the day of trial, Mr. Lippert refused to exit his jail cell and was brought into the 
courtroom by jail staff in his jail clothing because he had refused to change. Mr. Lippert claimed 
he was unaware that the trial was scheduled for that day, and that he had an extreme headache. 
Colloquy was held on the record between this Court and Mr. Lippert. At this time, Mr. Lippert 
once again raised his concerns about counsel. While this Court allowed Mr. Lippert to express 
his concerns on the record, the Court did not extensively question Mr. Lippert on his request for 
n~w counsel. Having reviewed the matter, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to this Court 
in order that a meaningful inquiry be held to determine whether Mr. Lippert possessed good 
cause for his request for substitute counsel on the morning of the fIrst day of trial. 
A hearing on the issue of substitute counsel was originally scheduled for August 27, 
2008. On that date, Mr. Lippert was not prepared to go forward on the matter, as he had lost his 
1 The facts of this case show that:Mr. Lippert requested substitute counsel on two occasions. The Court of Appeals 
has directed this Court to consider only whether the defendant should have been granted substitute counsel when he 
made the request on the morning of his trial. 
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Dotes while in transit to Clearwater County. Mr. Lippert also informed the Court that counsel 
would be representing him, but that counsel was not available immediately at the time of hearing. 
The matter was then rescheduled for September 15,2008, at which time the Court conducted its 
inquiry into Mr. Lippert's request for substitute counsel. During this inquiry Mr. Lippert took the 
stand and was questioned by counsel and the court. Following Mr. Lippert's testimony, the 
public defender took the stand and was questioned by counsel and the court. 
ANALYSIS 
1bis Court has been directed to conduct a meaningful inquiry to determine whether Mr. 
Lippert possessed good cause for his request for substitute counsel on the morning of the first day 
of trial. "Good cause includes an actual conflict of interest; a complete, irrevocable breakdown 
of communication; or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict. State 
v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 596-97, 181 P.3d 512, 522-23 (Ct. App. 2007), citing Smith v. 
Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing cases); McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 
931 (2nd Cir. 1981). See also United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231,1250 (lOth Cir. 2002). "If 
good cause is shown, the defendant is constitutionally entitled to the appointment of new 
counsel." fd., see State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960,964 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Further, "[i]n 
evaluating good cause, a trial court should also consider whether the request for substitute 
counsel was timely.,,2 State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 597, 181 P.3d 512,523 (Ct. App. 2007), 
citing State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 277, 61 P.3d 632,634 (Ct. App. 2002). 
2 In State v. Reber, the Idaho Court of Appeals determined a motion for self-representation was timely if it is made 
prior to the commencement of meaningful trial proceedings. Jd. at 277,61 P.3d at 634. Mr. Lippert's request for 
substitute counsel came before the commencement of the trial in the case at hand, therefore the motion was timely. 
Because the motion was timely made, this Court must determine whether Mr. Lippert set forth good cause for the 
substitution of counsel. 
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Based upon this Court's observation of the proceedings in this matter, and the inquiry 
made by this Court and counsel at the hearing held on September, 15,2008, this Court 
determines that Mr. Lippert did not have good cause for his request for substitute counsel on the 
morning of the fIrst day of trial. This Court will address individually the aspects of good cause 
as set forth by the Court of Appeals in State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho at 596, 181 P.3d at 522. 
1. Did an actual conflict of interest exist between Lippert and his appointed counsel? 
Good cause for a substitution of counsel may be established if an actual conflict of 
interest existed between counsel and the defendant. The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct set 
forth conflicts of interest in the practice of law in Rules 1.7 through 1.11. Rule 1.7 (b) allows an 
actual or potential conflict to be waived by the client. Conflicts of interest were discussed in 
detail in State v. Lopez, 139 Idaho 256, 77 P.3d 124 (Ct. App. 2003). 
"An actual or potential conflict cannot be waived if, in the circumstances 
of the case, the conflict is of such a serious nature that no rational defendant 
would knowingly and intelligently desire that attorney's representation. United 
States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76,95 (2nd Cir.2002). Conflicts can be divided into 
those which implicate the attorneys own self-interest and those which implicate 
the attorneys ethical obligation to someone other than the defendant, and the 
former are often more serious than the latter. See Schwarz, 283 F.3d at 96; United 
States v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605, 609 (2nd Cir.1993). 
Id. at 260, 77 P.3d at 128. 
During this Court's inquiry regarding substitution of counsel, Mr. Lippert made reference 
to two circumstances which may have created an actual conflict of interest between Mr. Lippert 
and his appointed counsel. First, Mr. Lippert claimed that appointed counsel had represented Mr. 
Lippert's aunt in her divorce during the early seventies and late eighties.3 Appointed counsel 
3 While testifying regarding his aunt, Mr. Lippert could not remember the exact time of her divorce proceedings and 
instead gave a large window oftime when the divorce may have occurred. Regardless of the date, it appears the 
divorce occurred prior to the time that appointed counsel began practicing law in Idaho. 
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testified that he did not recognize the name of the aunt and that he did not begin the practice of 
law in Idaho until 1987. Based upon this testimony, this Court is not convinced that an actual 
conflict of interest existed regarding Mr. Lippert's aunt. 
Mr. Lippert also alluded tci a conflict of interest regarding appointed counsel's 
representation of Mr. Lippert's former business partner. Mr. Lippert claimed that appointed 
counsel represented this business partner in a property dispute against Mr. Lippert. LR.P.C. 
1.7(a)(1) prohibits representation of a client if "the representation of one client will be directly 
adverse to another client. ... " LR.P.C. 17(a)(1). Appointed counsel did testify he had 
represented the business partner with regard to a wage claim that loggers had made, but not in 
any property issues. The representation happened sixteen or seventeen years in the past. Based 
upon this representation, Mr. Lippert has not established that an actual conflict of interest existed 
which prohibited appointed counsel from representing Mr. Lippert in the underlying criminal 
matter. Thus, good cause for substitution of counsel has not been established based upon an 
actual conflict of interest. 
2. Was there a complete, irrevocable breakdown of communication between Lippert and 
his appointed counsel? 
This Court must consider whether a complete, irrevocable breakdown in communication 
occurred between Mr. Lippert and appointed counsel, creating good cause for the substitution of 
counsel on the first day of trial. Factors to be used in examining a total breakdown of 
communication are set forth in United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2002). See also 
State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586,597,181 P.3d 512, 523 (Ct. App. 2007). The Court must 
consider: 
1) whether the defendant's motion for new counsel was timely; 2) whether the 
trial court adequately inquired into defendant's reasons for making the motion; 3) 
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whether the defendant-attorney conflict was so great that it led to a total lack of 
communication precluding an adequate defense; and 4) whether the defendant 
substantially and unreasonably contributed to the communication breakdown. 
Id. at 1250. Whether the motion was timely4 and whether the trial court adequately inquired into 
the defendant's reasons for making the motions need not be considered in great detail. However, 
in order to determine whether there was good cause for substitution of counsel, this COUlt must 
consider the last two factors set forth in Lott; whether the defendant-attorney conflict was so 
great that it led to a total lack of communication precluding an adequate defense and whether the 
defendant substantially and unreasonably contributed to the communication breakdown. Each 
issue will be addressed below. 
a. Whether the defendant-attorney conflict was so great that it led to a total lack of 
communication precluding an adequate defense. 
Mr. Lippert claims that there was a total lack of communication which precluded him 
from being provided an adequate defense at trial. First, Mr. Lippert argues that appointed 
counsel failed to communicate with him prior to trial which resulted in Mr. Lippert being unable 
4 The Idaho Court of Appeals considered whether a motion for self-representation was timely in State v. Reber, 138 
Idaho 275,61 P.3d 632 (Ct. App. 2002). 
A motion for self-representation is timely if made prior to the commencement of meaningful trial 
proceedings. Oakey, 853 F.2d at 553; Smith, 780 F.2d at 811; Fritz v. Spalding, 682 F.2d 782, 
784 (9th Cir.1982). Empanelment of a jury is a meaningful trial proceeding; thus, a motion for 
self-representation after jury empanelment is untimely. See US. v. Schaff, 948 F.2d 501, 503 (9th 
Cir.1991); Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882,888 (9th Cir.1990); Smith 780 F.2d at 811; Fritz, 682 
F.2d at 784. 
Id at 277,61 P.3d at 634. While inconvenient, this Court recognizes that Mr. Lippert's requests came prior to the 
empanelment of a jury in the trial proceedings. A jury panel had been summoned, and potential jurors were waiting 
in the courthouse, but proceedings to empanel a jury had not begun at the time :Mr. Lippert refused to exit his jail 
cell. Thus, this Court determines that:Mr. Lippert's request was timely because it occurred prior to the 
commencement of a meaningful trial proceeding. However, the timeliness of the motion, standing alone, does not 
establish that there was good cause for substitution of counsel. Because the motion was timely, the Court must 
consider the other factors set forth in Lott in order to determine whether there was good cause for the substitution of 
counsel in the case at hand. 
5 The second factor set forth in Lott is whether the trial court adequately inquired into defendant's reasons for 
making the motion for substitute counsel. Lott, 310 F.3d at 1250. As required by the Court of Appeals, a hearing 
was held to conduct a meaningful inquiry to determine whether Lippert possessed good cause for his request for 
substitute counsel. At this hearing, :Mr. Lippert was provided the opportunity to present his reasons for requesting 
counsel, accordingly, it is not necessary for this Court to address the second factor from Lott in detail. 
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to determine whether he should testify, or being aware of the information witnesses would 
provide in their testimony.6 Mr. Lippert asserts that appointed counsel refused to come to the jail 
to speak with him. Finally, Mr. Lippert asserted that his only communication with appointed 
counsel was via note-passing during the trial, which was one-way communication at best. 
"The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that he has a genuine irreconcilable 
conflict with counselor that there has been a total breakdown in communications." State v. 
Torres, 208 Ariz. 340,343,93 P.3d 1056, 1059 (2004). Guidance on whether a total breakdown 
in communication occurred between a defendant and appointed counsel can also be found in 
United States v. Lott, 310 U.S. 1231 (10th Cir. 2002). 
[A hearing helps] a court determine whether an attorney-client conflict rises to the 
level of a "total breakdown in communication" or instead whether the conflict is 
insubstantial or a mere "disagreement about trial strategy [that] does not require 
substitution of counsel." United States v. Taylor, 128 F.3d 1105, 1110 (7th 
Cir.l997). The types of communication breakdowns that constitute "total 
breakdowns" defy easy definition, and to our knowledge no court or commentator 
has put forth a precise definition. As a general matter, however, we believe that to 
prove a total breakdown in communication, a defendant must put forth evidence 
of a severe and pervasive conflict with his attorney or evidence that he had such 
minimal contact with the attorney that meaningful communication was not 
possible. 
Id. at 1249. 
An example of a situation which may have created in a total breakdown in 
communication is discussed in United States v. John Doe #1,272 F.3d 116 (2nd Cir. 2001). In 
this case, the Court determined that a total breakdown in communication had not occurred, even 
though court appointed counsel had initially motioned to withdraw based upon his concerns of 
threats made by his client. The trial court in John Doe initially denied the motion to withdraw, 
6 While Mr. Lippert claims to not be aware of the potential testimony of witnesses, many of these witnesses testified 
at the pretrial hearing regarding LR..E. 404(b) evidence. Mr. Lippert was in attendance with counsel at this hearing. 
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but as the time for trial grew near, the trial court held a hearing on the Defendant's pro se motion 
for substitution of counsel. 
Findley submitted a pro se motion to relieve Stapleton as trial counsel alleging 
that Stapleton harbored bad faith and failed to discuss defense strategies with 
Findley. The district court held a hearing on Findley's motion, during which 
Findley argued that there was a "conflict of interest" between him and Stapleton 
because Stapleton had repeatedly lied to him. In response, Stapleton indicated that 
he had had no communication with Findley since Findley's last appearance in 
court. Stapleton further stated that he had provided Findley with all discovery 
(which Findley disputed) and had given Findley a "candid estimation" of how the 
trial would proceed and end. Stapleton also described Findley's aggressiveness 
toward him, but expressed his willingness to continue to represent Findley, since 
he believed that Findley would act siniilarly with any other attorney. 
I d. at 120-21. Defendant Findley had made threats of physical violence to both counsel and his 
family in the past. Based upon the hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant's motion. Upon 
review, the trial court's determination was upheld, based upon the following reasoning: 
[WJhile the rift between Findley and Stapleton was at times intense as a result of 
Findley's violent and aggressive nature, the conflict between the two was not" 'so· 
great that it ... resulted in total lack of communication preventing an adequate 
defense.' " Simeonov, 252 F.3d at 241 (quoting Morrissey, 461 F.2d at 670). The 
record reveals that Findley and Stapleton did communicate prior to and during the 
course of the trial. Even after the district court repeatedly denied his withdrawal 
motions and after Stapleton expressed fear for his own and his family's safety, 
Stapleton carried out his duties as Findley's counsel by, for example, (1) filing no 
less than nine motions in limine; (2) initially attempting to dissuade Findley from 
. testifying, (3) arguing before the court, once Findley insisted on testifying, as to 
the admissibility of Findley's prior felony drug conviction, (4) cross-examining 
witnesses, and (5) making numerous objections to the government's questioning 
during the trial. Despite the conflict between Findley and Stapleton, it is clear that 
the two communicated in presenting Findley's defense. Further, the district court 
credited Stapleton's statements that he had given Findley the discovery provided 
by the Government, met with Findley to discuss strategy, and, despite the conflict, 
was willing to continue representing Findley during trial. Based on these facts, we 
cannot say that the conflict between Findley and Stapleton prevented an adequate 
defense. 
Id. at 124. 
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The rift between counsel and the defendant in John Doe was of a more tumultuous nature 
~, 
than the rift between counsel and MI. Lippert in the case at hand. Even so, the John Doe Court 
determined that a total breakdown in communication had not occurred. 
The case at hand is also similar to McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927 (2nd Cir. 1981), 
another case where the reviewing court upheld the trial court's determination that substitution of 
counsel was not warranted. The McKee Court determined that the defendant's arguments that a 
fundamental disruption of the integrity of the attorney-client relationship did not rise to the level 
of a total breakdown in communication. 
The grounds that McKee raised for substitution of counsel were that Occhetti had 
"prejudged" him and informed him that his chances of acquittal were slim. In 
addition, McKee suggests that Occhetti actually discussed with the prosecutor the 
fact of McKee's guilt. McKee argues that, regardless of whether these allegations 
are true, the resulting loss of trust wrought a "fundamental disruption of the 
integrity of the attorney-client relationship." Appellant's Br. at 8. Thus, the 
argument goes, there was a "complete brealcdown in communication" which 
warranted the eleventh-hour substitution, despite the potential for delay and 
disruption of the ongoing trial. We find these contentions to be meritless. 
Id. at 931 -9321.7 Similar complaints were made by MI. Lippert in the case before this Court. 
Based upon the hearing held on this matter, this Court is not persuaded that the Defendant has 
met his burden of establishing that a total brealcdown of communication occurred between 
himself and appointed counsel. 
At the hearing on this matter, MI. Lippert testified regarding whether there was a total 
breakdown of communication between himself and appointed counsel. MI. Lippert claimed he 
wrote several notes to counsel over a period of six months, but that counsel failed to reply to any 
7 A comprehensive list of cases of a similar nature, involving the total breakdown of communication between a client 
and appointed counsel is available at H.D.W., Annotation, Right of Defendant in Criminal Case to Discharge of or 
Substitution of Other Counsel for, Attorney Appointed by Court to Represent Him, 157 A.L.R. 1225 (originally 
printed in 1945, updated weekly). 
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of the questions posed in the notes. MI. Lippert also claims he never received assistance to 
research laws. Mr. Lippert claimed that counsel failed to prepare him for trial, and that he was 
not informed even of the actual date of trial. 8 Mr. Lippert also claimed that he did not know prior 
to trial that he would be called to testify, and that it was his belief that the Court coerced him into 
testifying. MI. Lippert also claimed that key witnesses were not called at the triaL Mr. Lippert 
did admit, during the recent hearing, that appointed counsel did visit him at the jail, usually after 
a hearing had taken place in court. 
Appointed counsel also testified at the hearing, first explaining procedural matters that 
happened during the course of the proceedings which led to trial. Appointed counsel explained 
the process of disqualifying the judge originally assigned to the case. Next, appointed counsel 
explained that he was appointed to represent Mr. Lippert in several matters, not just the charges 
that were tried in this case at hand. Several warrants were issued on these other matters, and 
charges on other issues were dismissed because the statute of limitations had expired. Appointed 
counsel testified that he spoke with the Defendant prior to and after the preliminary hearing. He 
provided the Defendant with all the information that had been obtained in discovery. Appointed 
counsel filed motions in limine on behalf of the Defendant and participated in complex pretrial 
hearings on these motions. Appointed counsel tracked down two witnesses from out of state at 
the request of the Defendant, however, he elected to not subpoena these witnesses after the 
Defendant claimed they would just lie about the situation anyway. Appointed counsel explained 
that Mr. Lippert was difficult to communicate with because he claimed the victim in the case was 
just lying about what had happened. Appointed counsel did claim that communication had 
8 While Mr. Lippert claimed to be unaware of the actual date of trial, he was present in Court during all pretrial 
proceedings, and the date of the trial was stated during these proceedings, therefore this argument does not support 
Mr. Lippert's claims that appointed counsel failed to communicate with him. 
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broken dovm. following the pretrial motion hearing regarding I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, but even so, 
counsel had visited Defendant prior to the trial and that Defendant was aware of the trial date. 
He also discussed with Mi. Lippert his right to not testify at trial, and communicated with the 
Defendant at trial after he elected to testify. Appointed counsel provided an adequate defense at 
trial, providing opening and closing statements, cross-examination of witnesses, presentation of 
witnesses on Mi. Lippert's behalf, and made appropriate objections during testimony. 
Considering the matter in total, this Court is not convinced that there was a total 
breakdown of communication between Mi. Lippert and appointed counsel. Mr. Lippert failed to 
provide evidence of a severe or pervasive conflict with counsel, nor did he establish that he had 
such minimal contact that meaningful communication was not possible. Therefore, good cause 
for the motion for substitution of counsel has not been established on the basis that there was a 
total breakdown of communication. 
b. Whether the defendant substantially and unreasonably contributed to the 
communication breakdown. 
This Court has determined that there was not a total breakdown of communication 
between Mr. Lippert and appointed counsel which precluded an adequate defense at trial. 
However, in order to provide a complete analysis, this Court will discuss whether the defendant 
substantially and unreasonably contributed to any communication brealcdovm. that may have 
occurred between himself and appointed counsel, based upon the factors provided in United 
States v. Loft, 310 F.3d at 1250. 
If a defendant requests substitution of counsel, he may not rely on his ovm. actions to 
establish good cause for the motion. "A defendant may not, however, manufacture good cause 
by abusive or uncooperative behavior." State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 597, 181 PJd 512, 523 
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(Ct. App. 2007), citing United States v. John Doe #1, 272 F.3d at 123. Several cases address the 
impact of a defendant's own actions with regard to whether substitute counsel should be 
appointed. See Tuitt v. Fair, 882 F.2d 166 (1st Cir. 1987)(last minute request to substitute 
counsel should not be allowed to become a vehicle for achieving delay); United States v. 
Andrews, 754 F.Supp. 1195 (N.D. ill. 1990)(disagreements between appointed counsel and 
defendant over trial strategy and impetuous relationship do not amount to a conflict necessitating 
substitution); United States v. Birrell, 286 F.Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); United States v. 
Morsley, 64 F.3d 907 (4th Cir. 1995).9 Further, the Defendant's last minute request for 
substitution of counsel should not be allowed to become a vehicle for achieving delay. 
A defendant's belated request for substitution of counsel is granted only where 
there exists "good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown of 
communication or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust 
verdict." McKee, 649 F.2d at 931 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
See also Schmidt, 105 F.3d at 89 ("On the eve of trial, just as during trial, a 
. defendant can only substitute new counsel when unusual circumstances are found 
to exist, such as' a complete breakdown of communication or an irreconcilable 
conflict"); United States v. Llanes, 374 F.2d 712, 717 (2d Cir.1967) ("Judges must 
be vigilant that requests for appointment of a new attorney on the eve of trial 
should not become a vehicle for achieving delay"). Although a defendant's "loss 
of trust" should be considered when assessing whether good cause for the 
substitution of assigned counsel exists, the defendant "must neveliheless afford 
the court with legitimate reasons for the lack of confidence." McKee, 649 F.2d at 
932. 
Latterell v. Conway, 430 F.Supp.2d 116, 123 (W.D.N.Y. 2006). 
In the caSe at hand, J\1r. Lippert substantially contributed to the breakdown in 
communication between himself and counsel, and his request for substitution of counsel made on 
the morning of trial was simply a tactic for delaying the trial proceedings. This Court finds that 
Mr. Lippert's actions did not rise to the level of egregious, threatening, abusive and 
9 A comprehensive list of similar cases is located at 157 A.L.R. 1225. 
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uncooperative behavior as compared to the defendant in United States v. John Doe #1,272 F.3d 
116 (2nd Cir. 2001), which was discussed in detail above. Nonetheless, Mr. Lippert failed to 
engage in meaningful communication with appointed counsel in a manner to best aid in his 
defense. Appointed counsel stated that Mr. Lippert was difficult to deal with and would not 
discuss the case in more detail than to state that he did not do what was alleged or express his 
beliefs that the victim and witnesses were lying. Counsel tracked down two witnesses at Mr. 
Lippert's request, but once they were located Mr. Lippert decided they would lie about the facts 
surrounding the charges against him. Even though Mr. Lippert complained that appointed 
counsel would not visit him at the jail, Mr. Lippert did concede that appointed counsel had come 
to the jail after hearings. Based upon this Court's own observations and the testimony provided 
at the recent hearing, this Court is not persuaded that the fault for a. possible lack of 
communication should be laid squarely on appointed counsel alone, but that:MI. Lippert 
substantially contributed to any breakdown of communication by his own actions. 
Having reviewed the factors set out in United States v. Lott, this Court is unpersuaded 
that a complete, irrevocable breakdown of communication occurred in the case at hand, thus, 
good cause for substitution of counsel on the morning of trial was not established. The Court 
fmds that while communication between appointed counsel and:MI. Lippert was difficult, it had 
not irretrievably and completely broken down to the point that :MI. Lippert could not aid in his 
own defense. Further, Mr. Lippert substantially contributed to the difficulty of communicating 
through his own actions. Therefore, the Defendant has not established good cause for the motion 
for substitution of counsel on the morning of trial. 
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3. Did an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict exist in this 
matter? 
Lastly, good cause for the substitution of counsel may be established if an irreconcilable 
conflict leads to an apparently unjust verdict. This issue was not argued by the Defendant in 
briefmg, nevertheless, the Court will address this issue in determining whether good cause 
existed for the substitution of counsel in this case. An irreconcilable conflict which lead to an 
apparently unjust verdict was discussed in Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970). In 
this case, a dispute arose almost immediately between the defendant and his assigned counsel. 
The defendant filed four motions for substitution of counsel, all of which were denied by the trial 
court without inquiry. Id. at 1169. The defendant "was forced into a trial with the assistance of a 
particular lawyer with whom he was dissatisfied, with whom he would not cooperate, and with 
whom he would not, in any manner whatsoever, communicate." Id. The reviewing court 
determined that the attorney was understandably deprived of the power to present an adequate 
defense on the defendant's behalf due to the complete lack of communication. Id. The 
defendant was found guilty by jury of first degree murder, and the trial judge promptly reduced 
the offense to murder in the second degree. Id. The reviewing court found, however, that it was 
"not unreasonable to believe that had Brown been represented by counsel in whom he had 
confidence he would have been convicted, if at all, of no more than the offense of manslaughter." 
ld. at 1170. Clearly, in Brown v. Craven, the irreconcilable conflict between counsel and the 
defendant resulted in an unjust verdict offust degree murder. 
In the case at hand, there is no suggestion that the verdict reached was an unjust verdict 
This case is distinguishable from Brown. First, in Brown, there was no communication in any 
manner between counsel and client almost immediately, as a result of a conflict that occurred 
:MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 14 
ON REMAND TO DETERMINE MOTION 
FOR SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL 
! 
shortly after counsel's appointment to the case. The same cannot be said in the case at hand. 
Further, it was clear that the trial judge in Brown was convinced immediately that an unjust 
verdict had been reached by the jury, and the trial judge promptly reduced the verdict to murder 
in the second degree. 10 There is no such disparity in the verdict determined by the jury in the 
case before this Court. Therefore, good cause for substitution of counsel cannot be based upon 
an argument that there was an irreconcilable conflict which led to an apparently unjust verdict. 
This Court has reviewed whether :Mr. Lippert possessed good cause for his request for 
substitute counsel on the morning of the fIrst day of trial. The Court has considered, fIrst, 
whether there was an actual conflict of interest; second, whether there was a complete, 
irrevocable breakdown of communication; and third, whether there was an irreconcilable conflict 
which lead to an apparently unjust verdict. Finding good cause absent, this Court determines that 
a substitution of counsel was not walTanted on the morning of the first day of trial. 
CONCLUSION 
On remand, this Court was required to conduct a meaningful inquiry to determine 
whether :Mr. Lippert possessed good cause for his request for substitute counsel on the morning 
of the fIrst day of his criminal trial. A hearing was held on the matter and briefs were submitted 
in the weeks following the hearing. This Court reviewed whether good cause was established 
based on whether there " was an actual conflict of interest; whether there was a complete 
irrevocable breakdown of communication; or whether there was an irreconcilable conflict which 
10 The Brown Court reversed judgment and remanded for a new trial. The trial court was directed to "grant Brown a 
new trial attended with all reasonable assurance that he be represented by competent counsel, from the Public 
Defender's office or elsewhere, in whom he may, ifhe does not demonstrate obstinance, recalcitrance, or 
unreasonable contumacy, repose his confidence." Id. at 1170. 
:MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 15 
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FOR SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL 
I >J 
Lead to an apparently unjust verdict. For the foregoing reasons, this Court determines 
that good cause did not exist for the substitution of counsel. 
ORDER 
On remand, it is determined that the Defendant's Motion for Substitution of 
Counsel is hereby DENIED. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED. 
/)tJt'~ 
DATED this...cc. day of February 2011. 
CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 16 
ORDER ON REMAND TO DETERMINE 
MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of 
the foregoing ORDER VACATING 
AND REENTERING 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 
ORDER ON REMAND TO 
DETERMINE MOTION FOR 
SUBSTITUE COUNSEL was 
mailed, postage prepaid, by the 
pndersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this 
Zzr'd.ay of February, 2011, on: 
Lori M. Gilmore 
POBox 2627 
Orofmo ID 83544 
Ken Nagy 
POBox 164 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Robert S. Lippert #81816 
ICC B-207-B 
POBox 70010 
Boise ID 83707 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 17 
ORDER ON REMAND TO DETERMINE 
MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL 
I I') 
ROBERT S. LIPPERT 
#81816, ICC 
PO BOX 70010 
BOISE, ID 83707 
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TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE PARTY'S 
ATTORNEY'S, CLEARWATER COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK 
OF THE ABOVE-NAMED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Defendant-Appellant, appeals against the State of Idaho to 
the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order Vacating and Reentering Memorandum 
Opinion and Order On Remand To Determine Motion For Substitute Counsel 
re-entered into the record on February 22, 2011, based on the District 
Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of law, and order on Petition for 
Post Conviction Relief in Clearwater County case number CV09-00194 , the 
Honorable Carl B. Kerrick, District Judge presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
Judgments described in paragraph one (1) above is appeallable pursuant to 
Rule 11(c) (1-10), IAR. 
3. That the Defendant requests the entire reporter's standard transcript as 
defined in Rule 25(c), IAR, and was lodged previously in Supreme Court 
Case No. 33028, State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 181 P.3d 512 (Ct. App. 
2008) • 
4. The Defendant also requests the preparation of the following additional 
portions of the transcript: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -1-
(a) September 15, 2008, Hearing held as a result of Idaho Court of Appeals 
Ruling in Supreme Court case number 33028. 
(b) The Reporter's Transcript that was previously lodged in Supreme Court 
case number 33028. 
5. Defendant requests the standard clerk's record pursuant to Rule 28(b)(2), JAR, 
and for judicial economy requests that the standard clerk's record that was 
lodged in Supreme Court case number 33028 be submitted. 
6. The Defendant also requests in addition to the standard clerk's record pursuant 
to Rule 28(b)(2), IAR, the following: 
(a) Any Briefs or Memorandums filed or lodged by the state, the defendant or 
the Court in support of, or in opposition to, matters that took place in 
the district court remand proceedings as set forth in the Idaho Surpeme 
Court's Case Number 33028. 
(b) Any motions or responses, including all attachments, affidavits and their 
exhibits, or copies of transcripts, filed or lodged by the state, defendant 
or the Court in support of, or in opposition to, the proceedings that took 
place in the district court due to the remand by the Idaho Supreme Court 
case number 33028. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter. 
(b) That the Defendant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee 
because he is indigent person and is unable to pay said fee. 
(c) That the Defendant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the record because he is an indegent person and is unable 
to pay said fee. 
(d) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20, JAR. 
8. That the Defendant anticipates raising issues including, but not limited to: 
Did the District Court exercise an abuse of discretion in determining that good 
cause did not exist for the substitution of counsel and denied Defendant's Motion 
for Substitution of Counsel, when it is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States? 
DATED MARCH~, 2011. Rk.tJ ' ~~R4; 
Robert S. Lippert, 'Appellant 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -2-
- \ 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ), 
ss. 
County of ADA ) 
ROBERT S. LIPPERT, being sworn, deposes and says: 
That the party is the appellant in the above-entitled appeal and that all 
statements in this Notice of Appeal are true and correct to the best of his 
knowledge and belief. 
&dJ~i .. 
Robert S. Lippert, Xppellant 
, 'if;. 
SUBSCRIBED, SWORN and AFFIRMED to on I;Y day 
t~¥-"'''''-·· 
;:~ !", --J'!':'A:-:;ME:'::S~G~. Q~U!~NN~""""'t 
~::', NOTARY PUBLIC 
U STATE OF IDAHO 
\, 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on MARCH~, 2011, I mailed the original to the Court 
for the purposes of filing and a true and correct copy via prison mail system, U.S. 
Mail first class postage to: 
CLEARWATER COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
PO BOX 2627 
OROFINO, ID 83544 
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ATTN: CRIMINAL LAW DIVISION 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0010 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT CLERK 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0101 
NANCY TOWLER, REPORTER 
NEZ PERCE COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
PO BOX 896 
LEWISTON, ID 83501 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
If2ktl-t;;J 
Robert S. Lippert 
-3-
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COMES NOW, ROBERT S. tIPPERT 
Case No. CR 2005-561 




, Defendant-Appellant in the 
above entitled matter and moves this Honorable Court to grant Defendant-Appellant's Motion 
for Appointment of Counsel for the reasons more fully set forth herein and in the Affidavit in 
Support of Motion for Appointment of Counsel. 
1. Defendant-Appellant is currently incarcerated within the Idaho Department of 
Corrections under the direct care, custody and control of Warden Timothy Wengler 
of the Idaho Correctional Center, Boise, JD 
2. The issues to be presented in this case may become to complex for the Defendant-
Appellant to properly pursue. Defendant-Appellant lacks the knowledge and skill' needed to 
represent himlherself. 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL - 1 
Revised: 10117/05 
3. Defendant-Appellant required assitance completing these pleadings, as he/she was 
unable to do it himlherself. 
4. Def~ndant-Appellant requeststbe Stare Appellate Public Defender 
be appointed in these matters. 
DATED this Js± day of AiH- ~h ,20_ . .... 
Defendant-Appellant 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss 
County of ADA ) 
-=-R=O=B=E=RT.::.......;S=-........ -=L=I=P-"'-P..=E""R=T ____ , after first being duly sworn upon hislher oath, deposes 
and says as follows: 
1. I am the Affiant in the above-entitled case; 
2. I am currently residing at the Idaho Correctional Center, Boise, ID. 
under the care, custody and control of Warden Timothy Weng] er 
3. I am indigent and do not have any funds to hire private counsel; 
4. I am without bank. accounts, stocks, bonds, real estate or any other form of real 
property; 
5. I am unabl~ to provide any other form of security; 
6. I am untrained in the law; 
7. If I am forced to proceed without counsel being appointed I will be unfairly 
handicapped in competing with trained and competent counsel of the State; 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL - 2 
Revised: 10/17/05 
Further your affiant sayeth !laught. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant-Appellant respectfully prays that this Honorable 
Court issue it's Order granting Defendant-Appellant's Motion for Appointment of Counsel to 
represent hislher interest, or in the alternative grant any such relief to which it may appear the 
Defendant-Appellant is entitled to. 
DATED This 1 "'z r day of--,-~--,,-,,-,--,=A,-, _____ , 20-LL. 
ST 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN AND AFFIRMED to before me this L day 
of {V)c(fC>~ ,20_"_. 
(SEAL) 
ComlllsslOn exprres: ID (3 , 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL - 3 
Revised: 10117/05 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the M day of &arc/h , 20 /! , I 
mailed a copy of this MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
COUNSEL for the purposes of filing with the court and of mailing a true and correct copy via 
prison mail system for processing to the U.S. mail system to: 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Lori:LMW Gff:1Ih0r·e::- -eputy County Prosecuting Attorney 
PO BOX 2627 
Orofino, ID 83544 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL - 4 
Revised: 10/17/05 
ROBERT S. LIPPERT 
Full Name of Party Filing This Document 
#81816, ICC 
Mailing Address (Street or Post Office Box) 
PO BOX 70010 
City, State and Zip Code 
BOISE, ID 83707 
Telephone Number 
;"" " <-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE'STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT S. LIPPERT 
Defendant. 
Case No.: CR 2005-561 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR 
PERMISSION TO PROCEED ON PARTIAL 
PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER) 
IMPORTANT NOTICE: Idaho Code § 31-3220A requires that you serve upon counselfor 
the county sheriff, the department of correction or the private correctional facility .. 
whichever may apply, a copy of this motion and affidavit and any other documents filed 
in connection with this request. You must file proof of such service with the court when 
you file this document. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of ADA ) 
[ ] Plaintiff [ !] Defendant asks to start or defend this case on partial payment of court 
fees, and swears under oath 
1. Thisisanactionfor(typeofcase) Appeal of Memorandum Decision. I 
believe I'm entitled to get what I am as king for. 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO 
PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES 
(PRISONER) 
CAO HOC 2125/2005 
PAGE 1 
-,.-
2. [.{' have not previously brought this claim against the same party or a claim based on 
the same operative facts in any state or federal court. [ ] I have filed this claim against the 
same party or a claim based on the same oper ative facts in a state or federal court. 
3. I am unable to pay all the court costs now. I have attached to this affidavit a cur rent 
statement of my inmate account, certified by a custodian of inm ate accounts, that reflects the 
activity of the account over my period of incarceration or for the last twelve (12) months, 
whichever is less. 
4. I understand I will be required to pay an initial partial filing fee in the am ount of 20% of the 
greater of: (a) the average monthly deposits to my inmate account or (b) the average monthly 
balance in my inmate account for the last six (6) months. I also understand that I must pay the 
remainder of the filing fee by making monthly paym ents of 20% of the preceding month's 
income in my inmate account until the fee is paid in full. 
5. I verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true. I understand that a false 
statement in this affidavit is perjury and I could be sent to prison for an additional fourteen (14) 
years. 
Do not leave any items blank. If any item does not apply, write "N/A". Attach additional pages 
if more space is needed fo r any response. 
IDENTIFICATION AND RESIDENCE: 
Name: ROBERT S. LIPPERT Other name(s) I have used: Po b 5u-tf 
Address: #81816. ICC, PO BOX 70010, BOISE. ID 83707 
How long at that address? Phone: _______ _ 
Date and place of birth:  i1141v'L(iiJ.. 6clls) Of~ 
DEPENDENTS: 
I am J><l single [ ] married. If married, you must provide the following information: 
Nameofspouse: __________________________________________________ ___ 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO 
PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES 
(PRISONER) 
CAO i-i0e 2125/2005 
PAGE 2 
My other dependents (including minor children) are: ______________ _ 
INCOME: 
My spouse's income: $ -.L.I'---!..-'--__ per [ J week [ J month. 
ASSETS: IJo /1 {2 
List all real property (land and buildings) owned or being purchased by you. 
Your 
Address City State 
Legal 
Description 
List all other property owned by you and state its value. 
Description (provide description for each item) 
Cash In/1"J,.1tK Ly«f.!/- RC-Cd(d/ll 
Notes and Recei vables 
Vehicles: 
BanklC redit Union/Savinqs/C heckinq Accounts 
Stocks/Bonds/I nvestm ents/Certificates of Deposit 
Trust Funds 
Retirement Accounts/IRAs/401 (k)s 




MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO 
PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES 
(PRISONER) 












EXPENSES: List all of your monthly expenses. 
Expense 
Rent/House Pavm ent 
Vehicle Payment( s) 
Credit Cards: (list each account number) 











MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO 
PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES 
(PRISONER) 





















How much can you borrow? $ ____ 69_-_,1,_, __ From whom? ______ '"_' ___ _ 
When did you file your last income tax return? ____ Amount of refund: $ _____ _ 
PERSONAL REFERENCES: (These persons must be able to verify information provided) 
Name Address Phone Years Known 
Robert S. Lippert 
Typed or Printed Name 
20~SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me th\". ,51 d,ay~ ~~~h . 
~/JEL.~~ 
f'k{ary Putllrc for Idaho " 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO 
PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES 
(PRISONER) 
CAO 1-10C 2125/2005 
Residing at ______ -,-___ _ 
My Commission expires _____ -'--_ 
..• ~ 
PAGE 5 
IDOC TRUST =========== OFFENDER BANK BALANCES ========== 02/28/2011 = 
)oc No: 81816 Name: LIPPERT I ROBERT S 
cccount: CHK Status: ACTIVE 
ICC/UNIT J PRES FACIL 
TIER-O CELL-2 
Transaction Dates: 02/28/2010-02/28/2011 
Beginning Total Total Current 
Balance Charges Payments Balance 
67.43 285.85 212.43 5.99DB 
=============================== TRANSACTIONS ================================ 
late Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
3/09/2010 IC0491857-726 099-COMM SPL 
3/12/2010 IC0492324-005 070-PHOTO COpy 
3/16/2010 HQ0492653-018 011-RCPT MO/CC 
3/25/2010 IC0493726-004 070-PHOTO COPY 
3/29/2010 IC0493937-025 078-MET MAIL 
3/30/2010 IC0494027-626 099-COMM SPL 
4/06/2010 IC0494765-598 099-COMM SPL 
4/06/2010 IC0494955-006 071-MED CO-PAY 
4/06/2010 IC0494963-016 070-PHOTO COpy 
4/08/2010 HQ0495331-019 061-CK INMATE 
4/09/2010 IC0495425-015 071-MED CO-PAY 
4/15/2010 IC0496206-024 078-MET MAIL 
4/15/2010 IC0496224-004 070-PHOTO COPY 
4/15/2010 IC0496224-006 070-PHOTO COPY 
4/16/2010 IC0496361-006 070-PHOTO COPY 
5/03/2010 IC0497880-005 070-PHOTO COPY 
5/06/2010 IC0498702-021 071-MED CO-PAY 
5/13/2010 IC0499904-011 078-MET MAIL 
5/13/2010 IC0499906-020 070-PHOTO COPY 
5/19/2010 IC0500422-001 317-REFUND MEDICAL 
5/19/2010 IC0500422-002 317-REFUND MEDICAL 
0/26/2010 HQ0519688-006 011-RCPT MO/CC 
0/26/2010 IC0519743-002 070-PHOTO COpy 
1/02/2010 IC0520360-558 099-COMM SPL 
1/03/2010 IC0520665-021 078-MET MAIL 
1/03/2010 IC0520688-028 071-MED CO-PAY 
1/04/2010 IC0520815-022 070-PHOTO COPY 
1/29/2010 IC0523403-004 078-MET MAIL 
1/30/2010 IC0523588-007 070-PHOTO COPY 
2/02/2010 IC0524096-001 325-REFUND PHOTO C 
2/16/2010 IC0526441-019 071-MED CO-PAY 
2/17/2010 IC0526568-460 099-COMM SPL 
2/20/2010 IC0526631-460 099-COMM SPL 
2/20/2010 IC0526723-460 099-COMM SPL 
2/20/2010 IC0526726-460 099-COMM SPL 
2/20/2010 IC0526728-460 099-COMM SPL 
2/23/2010 HQ0527268-001 011-RCPT MO/CC 
2/27/2010 IC0527541-028 071-MED CO-PAY 
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IDOC TRUST =========== OFFENDER BANK BALANCES ========== 02/28/2011 = 
)oc No: 81816 Name: LIPPERT, ROBERT S 
\..ccount: CHK Status: ACTIVE 
ICC/UNIT J PRES FACIL 
TIER-O CELL-2 
Transaction Dates: 02/28/2010-02/28/2011 
Beginning Total Total Current 
Balance Charges Payments Balance 
67.43 285.85 212.43 5.99DB 
================================ TRANSACTIONS ================================ 
)ate Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
._-------- ------------- ------------------ ---------- ---------- -----------
)1/07/2011 IC0529080-015 078-MET MAIL 128313 1.76DB 45.24 
)1/07/2011 IC0529127-003 070-PHOTO COPY 128312 2.70DB 42.54 
)1/11/2011 IC0529332-615 099-COMM SPL 21.12DB 21.42 
)1/11/2011 IC0529335-016 100-CR INM CMM 1. 33 22.75 
)1/21/2011 IC0530604-003 078-MET MAIL 129821 14.95DB 7.80 
)2/08/2011 IC0532636-555 099-COMM SPL 6.84DB 0.96 
)2/15/2011 IC0533363-688 099-COMM SPL 0.95DB 0.01 
)2/25/2011 IC0534631-014 071-MED CO-PAY 045335 6.00DB 5.99DB 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION 
TO PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER) 
Server 3/111 1 9:04:32 AM PAGE 4/01 Fax Server 
Inmale name Robert S. Lippert 
TDOCNo. if8l8l6, ICC 
Address PO BOX 70010 
BOISE, ID 83707 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE _...;,:S:.o:EC""-'O=N"""D ____ JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF TIIE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEAR HATER 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) Case No. CR 2005-561 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) ORDER GRANTING 
VS. ) MOTION FOR 
) APPOINTMENT 
ROBERT 8, LIPPERT ) OF COUNSEL 
) 
Defen d an t-Appellant. ) 
) 
IT IS lIEARBY ORDERED that t11e Defendant-Appellant's Motion for 
Appointment of Counsel is granted and the State Appellate Public Defender's 
Office, a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, is hereby appointed to represent 





ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL 
Revised 10117/05 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
ROBERT S. LIPPERT, 
Defendant/Appellant 
On Appeal. 
SUPREME COURT NO. 38613 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Courtney Stifanick, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of 
the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for 
the County of Clearwater, do hereby certify that copies of the 
Clerk's Record were placed in the United States mail and 
addressed to Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, P. O. 
Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0188 and STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane, Boise, 10 1~ 83703 this day 
of April 2011. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of the said Court this :t~ day of April 2011. 
DISTRICT COURT 
1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
